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Abstract 
Problems in logic are well known to be hard to solve in the worst case. ‘l%o different strate- 
gies for dealing with this aspect are known from the literature: language restriction and theory 
approximation. 
In this paper we are concerned with the second strategy. Our main goal is to define a semanti- 
cally well-founded logic for approximate reasoning, which is justifiable from the intuitive point of 
view, and to provide fast algorithms for dealing with it even when using expressive languages. We 
also want our logic to be useful to perform approximate r asoning in different contexts. We define 
a method for the approximation of decision reasoning problems based on multivalued logics. Our 
work expands and generalizes, in several directions, ideas presented by other researchers. The 
major features of our technique are: ( 1) approximate answers give semantically clear information 
about the problem at hand; (2) approximate answers are easier to compute than answers to the 
original problem; (3) approximate answers can be improved, and eventually they converge to the 
right answer; (4) both sound approximations and complete ones are described. 
The method we propose is flexible enough to be applied to a wide range of reasoning problems. 
In our research we considered approximation of several decidable problems with different worst- 
case complexity, involving both propositional and first-order languages. In particular we defined 
approximation techniques for: propositional logic, fragments of first-order logic (concept descrip- 
*Work supp0rte.d by the ESPRIT Basic Research Action 6810-COMPLLOG II and by the Progetto 
Finalizzato Sistemi Informatici e Calcolo Parallel0 of the CNR (Italian Research Council). Parts of this 
paper appeared in prGninaxy form in papers presented at the Fourth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of 
Reasoning about Knowledge (TARK-92), the Third International Conference on the Principles of Knowledge 
Representation a d Reasoning (KR-92) and the Second Italian Conference on AI ( AI*IA-91) . 
* Corresponding author. E-mail: cadoli@assi.dis.uniromal .it. 
1 E-mail: schaerf@assi.dis.uniromal.it. 
0004-3702/95/.@9.50 @ 1995 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved 
SSDIOOO4-3702(94)00009-P 
250 M. Schaerf. M. Cudoli/Artifciul Intelligence 74 (1995) 249-310 
tion languages) and modal logic. In our research we also addressed the issue of representing the 
knowledge of a reasoner with limited resources and how to use such a knowledge for approximate 
reasoning purposes. 
1. Introduction 
The benefits of formalizing AI problems in logic are manifold [ 45,601. Nevertheless 
we have to pay a price for that: one of the major drawbacks of logic as an AI tool is in 
that if we formalize AI problems as logical problems then typically the tasks that we are 
supposed to perform have high computational complexity. Problems in logic are well 
known to be hard to solve in the worst case: the prototypical NP-complete problem is to 
check whether a formula of propositional logic is consistent [ 171, while the prototypical 
r.e.-complete problem is to check whether a formula of first-order logic is inconsistent 
[ 641. We notice that-from the AI perspective-consistency checking is a basic task, 
which is subsumed by many formalisms in knowledge representation (e.g. knowledge 
update.) 
The computational drawback caused by logical formalization of problems is not a 
peculiarity of AI: Vardi in [73] shows how an increase in complexity characterizes the 
formalization of databases as logical objects versus their characterization as physical 
objects. 
In fact the use of “fancy” forms of logic as tools for knowledge representation makes 
the computational drawback even more sensible. Logical formalisms that are used in 
AI typically have higher computational complexity than classical-propositional or first- 
order-logic. As an example, consistency checking in propositional classical logic is 
NP-complete, while consistency checking in the propositional modal logic S4-a logic 
which is commonly used for representing the knowledge modality [ 431 -is PSPACE- 
complete [ 521. 
Since researchers realized this fundamental drawback, two different strategies emerged 
in the literature: 
( 1) According to the ideas presented in [ 61, we can restrict the language used for 
representing knowledge so that the formalization of interesting cases is still pos- 
sible, but resulting tasks are computationally feasible, i.e. polynomially tractable 
or at least decidable. As an example, propositional logic can be restricted to 
Horn clauses, which allow linear algorithms for satisfiability testing [ 281. 
(2) According to [ 551, we could use a form of logic that allows weaker inferential 
power but is computationally feasible even with a full expressiveness in the 
language. As an example, propositional calculus without the modus ponens rule 
admits polynomial algorithms for consistency testing [ 36,541. 
Both ideas received great attention both from the theoretical and from the application- 
oriented community. The limited expressiveness strategy underlies the whole database 
approach. The CLASSIC knowledge representation system [4,5], built at AT&T and 
currently used in an industrial environment, uses both strategies. CLASSIC adopts a re- 
stricted language-thus avoiding some sources of intractability-but allows constructors 
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that lead to intractable reasoning problems. Such constructors are dealt with incomplete 
inference algorithms grounded on non-standard semantics. 
For what concerns the language restriction approach, fundamental studies on the com- 
plexity of fragments of classical propositional [661 and first-order logic [ 291 have been 
done in the last decades. More recently, computational studies about several ogical 
formalisms relevant for KR appeared. Studies analyzing the so-called tractability thresh- 
old between polynomially tractable and intractable languages are of particular practical 
interest. Among the most significant in this group we cite [27] on concept description 
languages, [ 48,7 11 on default logic, [ 101 on closed-world reasoning and circumscrip- 
tion, [ 3 1 ] on logic-based abduction, [ 701 on path-based inheritance, [ 81 on set covering 
abduction. 
As far as weak forms of reasoning are concerned, it is well known that AI has 
always dealt with approximation, incompleteness and heuristics. The kind of weak 
reasoning we are interested in in this work can be described in a nutshell as follows: 
we have a satisfactory logical formalization of a reasoning problem, but we don’t want 
to implement it exactly as it is, because it is computationally too expensive; hence we 
look for a formalization that “looks like” our favorite one, but it is easier to compute. 
In this work we are mainly interested in decision problems, as reasoning problems 
usually admit a boolean answer. Informally, an approximate solution to a decision 
problem is a “maybe” answer, equipped with reasons to believe that the “maybe” is 
actually a “yes” or to believe that it is actually a “no”. In a form of approximate 
reasoning called sound reasoning we have two possible answers: “yes” and “maybe 
no”. In the dual form of approximate reasoning (complete reasoning), the two possible 
answers are “no” and “maybe yes”. 
The obvious important questions we are faced with are: how do we measure the 
accuracy of an approximate answer? How do we know an approximate answer is any 
better than another one? It is important o recall that in logic we have no explicit metric 
that gives an immediate answer to the above questions. In this respect, approximation 
of reasoning problems is more difficult to study than approximation of optimization 
problems. Approximation schemata for reasoning problems are typically justified by 
means of cognitive or epistemic arguments (e.g. “this is an approximate but satisfactory 
description of how people reason”). 
Logic-based study of approximate r asoning is receiving increasing attention in the Al 
community. Several formalisms for weak reasoning that are supported by a “reasonable” 
semantics recently appeared. To this end the most significant approaches to a formal 
description of partial reasoning are Levesque’s [ 54-561 architecture based on incomplete 
reasoning, Frisch’s [ 35,361 limited inference systems, Crawford and Kuiper’s [ 191 
access-limited logic, Kautz and Selman’s [47,49,69] knowledge compilation and Dean 
and Boddy’s [23] any-time algorithms, further investigated by Russell and Zilberstein 
in [ 651 and by Ginsberg in [ 391. 
In this work we are interested in the “tractability via approximation” approach. Our 
goal is to define a semantically well-founded logic for approximate r asoning, justifiable 
from the intuitive point of view, and to provide fast algorithms for dealing with it 
even when using expressive languages. We also want our logic to be useful to perform 
approximate reasoning in different contexts. 
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We define a method for the approximation of decision reasoning problems based 
on multivalued logics. The use of multivalued logics for representing forms of local, 
incomplete and polynomially tractable reasoning has already been attempted by other 
authors (cf. [ 36,541.) Our work expands and generalizes in several directions ideas 
presented by those researchers. 
In order to introduce the topic of logic-based approximation, in this paper we survey 
two methods that have been defined in the literature by other authors: Levesque’s 
incomplete reasoning and Selman and Kautz’s knowledge compilation. The analysis of 
these methods motivates a list of desiderata for a new theory of approximation. 
The major features of our technique are: 
l approximate answers give semantically clear information about the problem at hand; 
l approximate answers are easier to compute than answers to the original problem; 
l approximate answers can be improved, and eventually they converge to the right 
answer; 
l both sound approximations and complete ones are described. 
Our method differs from the existing ones in one or more of the above points. 
The method we propose is flexible enough to be applied to a wide range of reasoning 
problems. In our research we considered approximation of several decidable problems 
with different worst-case complexity, involving both propositional and first-order lan- 
guages. In particular we defined approximation techniques for: 
( 1) propositional logic; 
(2) fragments of first-order logic (concept description languages) ;
(3) modal logic. 
In our research we also addressed the issue of representing the knowledge of a reasoner 
with limited resources and how to use such a knowledge for approximate reasoning 
purposes. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we survey two methods for 
approximate reasoning that have been defined in the literature by other authors. Our 
desiderata for a theory of approximation are given in Section 3. In Section 4 we formal- 
ize our technique and we illustrate it for entailment in propositional logic. In Section 5 
we discuss the algorithmic aspects of such an approximation. In Section 6 we ad- 
dress the issue of representing in a modal language the approximate knowledge owned 
by a limited reasoner. In Sections 7 and 8 we apply the approximation technique to 
intractable tasks in fragments of first-order logic and propositional modal logics, re- 
spectively. In Section 9 we draw some conclusions, address open problems and sketch 
future research. All the proofs of the theorems are presented in appropriate appen- 
dices. 
2. Logic-based methods for approximation: existing techniques 
In this section we illustrate two logic-based methods for approximate reasoning and 
we make a brief comparison of them. In order to give the flavor of what is going on in 
the field, we show a “classic” method (Levesque’s), which has been analyzed and used 
by several authors, and a new-but already popular-one (Selman and Kautz’s). 
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2.1. Levesque s limited inference 
The first method has been introduced by Levesque in several works [ 54-561 and it is 
based on the idea of limited inference. Independently, Frisch [ 35,361 developed similar 
formalizations. 
Levesque argues that if we are to model the mental activity of an agent, it is not 
reasonable to assume that he always answers queries by using a method that needs an 
exponential amount of time. It is more realistic to assume that, when faced with normal 
problems, the agent only applies simple inference rules. On the other hand, when the 
agent is faced with extremely important or tricky questions, he moves to what Levesque 
calls a “puzzle mode” and uses more complex inference procedures. As a consequence, 
a knowledge representation and reasoning system should be able to distinguish between 
what is explicit or evident in what he knows, and what is implicit and can be inferred 
given enough time and motivation. Since ordinary logic does not make any distinction 
of this kind, it is necessary to make appropriate formal steps in this direction. 
Levesque notices that a good deal of reasoning is based on detecting that a sentence 
and its negation are contradictory. As an example, starting from (p V q) A (14 V r) , we 
infer that (p V r) because q and lq are contradictory. On the other hand we can think 
about a shallow reading of sentences, where the contradiction between a sentence and 
its negation is not observed. In particular, reasoning like in the above example is not 
possible in the shallow reading. 
Levesque gives in [56] a formal definition-based on multivalued logics-of the 
notion of shallow reading of sentences. L denotes a set of propositional letters. A literal 
is a letter 1 of L or its negation ~1. L* denotes the set of all literals associated with the 
letters of L. A truth assignment is a function mapping the set of literals L* into the set 
(091). 
Definition 2.1 (Levesque [561). A 3-interpretation of L* is a truth assignment which 
does not map both a letter 1 of L and its negation ~1 into 0. 
According to this definition, for each propositional letter I and each 3-interpretation 
I there are three possibilities (hence the name 3-interpretation): 
(1) Z(Z) = 1 and Z(lZ) =O; 
(2) Z(Z) = 0 and Z(7Z) = 1; 
(3) Z(Z) = 1 and Z(7Z) = 1. 
Standard (2-valued) interpretations admit only the first two possibilities (where 1 is, 
respectively, true or false). The third possibility can be regarded as the logical value 
contnzdiction. 
The notion of 3-interpretation is extended to formulae in Conjunctive Normal Form 
(CNF) in the following way: a 3-interpretation Z satisfies a clause iff it maps one of its 
literals into 1; Z satisfies a CNF formula iff it satisfies all of its clauses. In Section 4 
we show how to define the 3-interpretation of an arbitrary formula. 
The relation of 3-entailment can be immediately defined in the intuitive way:’ T 
* Our terminology and symbols are different from those used by Levesque. 
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3-entails y (written T k” y) iff every 3-interpretation mapping T into 1 also maps y 
into 1. Levesque notices that 3-entailment has interesting properties: 
l soundness: for each T and y, it holds that (T k3 r) implies (T /= 7) ; 
l polynomial&y: if both T and y are in CNF, then T k3 y can be tested in 0( JTI .Iyl) 
time. 
Another independent motivation for k=” is that (T k’ r) holds iff either y is a tautology 
or T tautologically entails y in the system of Relevance Logic of Anderson and Belnap 
and Dunn [2,30], as shown in [56]. Moreover k3 can be modeled in terms of the 
proof theory of propositional calculus without the modus ponens inference rule (see also 
]35,361). 
Example 2.2 (Modus ponens does not hold for 3-entailment). Let L be the set {a, b}, 
and T be {a, ~a V 6). Clearly both T k=’ a and T k3 la V b hold, hence 3-entailment 
captures explicit knowledge. On the other hand T b b holds, but T k3 b does not hold: 
the truth assignment which maps a, ~a and -b into 1 and b into 0 is a 3-interpretation 
satisfying T. 
Levesque’s conclusion is that k=” can model the kind of quick surface reasoning 
that the agent should always do prior to any form of deep logical analysis or problem 
solving, i.e. before entering into the “puzzle mode”. 
2.2. Selman and Kautz’s Horn compilation 
The second method has been introduced by Selman and Kautz in [47,49,69] and it 
is based on the idea of knowledge compilation. 
The starting point of the technique stems on the fact that testing 2 k a-where 2 
and (Y are propositional formulae-is in general co-NP-complete, while it is doable in 
polynomial time when ,E is a Horn formula and (Y is in CNF. The fascinating question 
addressed by Selman and Kautz is the following: is it possible to compiEe a propositional 
formula 2 into a Horn one 2’ so that a significant amount of the inferences that are 
performed under 2 can be performed under 2’ in polynomial time? 
Selman and Kautz notice that there exist two different ways of doing such a compila- 
tion. In the first case the compiled formula satisfies the relation .Z’ k 2, or equivalently 
M ( 2’) C M ( 2) -where M (@) denotes the set of models of the formula @. For this 
reason 2’ is called a Horn lower bound-or LB-of 2. As an example, 3 let @ be the 
fo~ula(a-c)A(b-c)A(aVb).Thefo~ula~~~=aAbAcisaHornLBof~. 
The second form of compilation is dual. The compiled version of 2 is a Horn formula 
_Z’ that satisfies the relation 2’ + X’, or equivalently M (2) C M (2’). X’ is called 
a Horn upper bound-or UB-of 2. Returning to the previous example, the formula 
4&, = (a - c) A (b ---+ c) is a Horn UB of @. 
Compiled forms of a knowledge base can sometimes be used for providing a quick 
answer to an inference problem. As an example, if we are faced with the problem of 
checking Z?Z b LY, we may benefit from the fact that for any Horn LB &, of 2, & p a 
’ Taken from I69 I 
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implies .Z p (Y. & is therefore a complete approximation of 2. Dually, a Horn UB &, 
is a sound approximation of 2, since &, b a implies B k (Y. 
Selman and Kautz define the notion of Horn greatest lower bound or GLB of a 
formula 2, which is a Horn formula &glb such that M (&b) c M (2) and for no Horn 
formula .X’ it holds that M (&lb) C M (2’) E M (2). A Horn GLB is in some sense 
the “best” complete Horn approximation. Continuing the previous example, <qb2 = a A c 
is a Horn GLB of @. 
Dually, a Horn least upper bound or LUB of a formula 2 is a Horn formula &b such 
that M (2) c M (&b) and for no Horn formula 2’ it holds that M (2) C_ M ( 2’) c 
M (&b). @&,2 = c is a Horn LUB of @. 
Selman and Kautz’s proposal is to approximate inference under a propositional for- 
mula _Z by using its Horn GLBs and LUBs. In this way inference could be unsound 
or incomplete, but it is anyway possible to spend more time and use a general infer- 
ence procedure to determine the answer directly from the original theory. The general 
inference procedure could still use the approximations toprune its search space. 
We now summarize the major properties of Horn GLBs and LUBs stated in [47,49, 
691: 
l size of the formula with respect o the size 1x1 of 2 
- GLB: linear; 
- LUB: in general exponential; 
l number of possible approximations of this kind: 
- GLB: one; 
- LUB: many; 
l computational complexity of the search problem of finding the approximation: 
- GLB: PIP-hard; 
- LUB: NP-hard. 
Other authors [ 9,411 have further explored the Horn compilation method, analyzing 
several computational properties. Relations between Horn compilation and nonmonotonic 
reasoning are shown in [ 91. 
2.3. Comparison between the two approaches 
Levesque’s approach is characterized by philosophical motivations and aims at build- 
ing inference systems justifiable from the intuitive point of view. Semantics i  important 
for Levesque, as well as a comparison to techniques for the formalization of limited 
reasoning developed in different fields (e.g. Relevance Logic [ 21). Selman and Kautz’s 
method is motivated with strictly computational rguments, and semantics of approxi- 
mate answers is given in terms of the syntactic notion of Horn clause. 
Knowledge compilation supports ound inferences as well as complete ones. Leves- 
que’s method is only sound. 
Levesque’s inference is done in polynomial time. Both kinds of Horn compilation are 
polynomially intractable and the Horn LUB needs exponential space. 
While knowledge compilation can be done off-line, Levesque’s incomplete inference 
has to be performed on-line. Compiled knowledge bases can be used for answering 
many queries. 
256 M. Schuer$ M. Cudoli/Artijiciul Intelligence 74 (1995) 249-310 
Both methods are characterized by being “one-shot”: if we know that the approximate 
solution may be wrong, the sole thing to do is to resort on general-purpose theorem- 
proving procedures. In a nutshell: the quality of approximate solutions is not improvable. 
Levesque’s idea has been generalized to the solution of other reasoning problems, like 
epistemic reasoning [ 53,541 and reasoning in terminological languages [ 611. 
3. Guidelines of a new method for approximation 
Here is our desiderata list for a theory of approximate reasoning. We would like a 
method that is: 
l semantically well-founded: approximate answers should give semantically clear in- 
formation about the problem at hand; 
l computationally attractive: approximate answers should be easier to compute than 
answers to the original problem; 
l improvable: approximate answers can be improved, and eventually they converge 
to the right answer (provided we have enough time and motivation); 
l dual: both sound approximations and complete ones should be described; 
l flexible: the approximation schema should be general enough to be applied to a 
wide range of reasoning problems. 
We found in Levesque’s approach inspiration for developing a method that fulfills all 
the above desiderata. Loosely speaking we added to Levesque’s method duality and 
improvability, keeping its nice computational features and its semantical flavor coming 
from a clear formulation in multivalued logics. We give now an abstract description of 
our technique. 
We model a reasoning task as the problem of deciding whether a string x belongs to a 
set V (e.g. the set of satisfiable propositional formulae) or not. The method we defined 
for approximating a reasoning problem, or equivalently the corresponding set V, relies 
on the definition of two sequences of sets (‘&,V)I, . . . , IO,,,) and (VO,V’, . . . , P) such 
that 
v(j c v, c . ‘. g vD,, = ;I, = 2)” g IY- & . g DO. 
The sequences have the following properties: 
l The lengths n and m of the sequences are polynomial with respect to the input x 
of the problem. 
l The elements of both sequences are defined by means of a semantics closely related 
to that of V. 
l Deciding whether the input string x belongs to V” or not (or loosely, deciding 
membership in V”) is a polynomial problem; the same holds for ‘DO. In general 
deciding membership in Vi and in Vi gets exponentially harder as i grows, but it 
is not harder than deciding membership in V. 
The reasoning task is performed in an incremental fashion, by deciding membership in 
sets Vi and Vj of both sequences for increasing indexes i and j, starting with i = j = 0. 
If we prove membership in any Vi, then we have also proved membership in V; on 
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the other hand if we disprove membership in any Vj, then we have also disproved 
membership in D. 
There are clearly two possibilities when we use this method: either we are able to 
solve the reasoning problem in a reasonable amount of time (in general for small indices 
i and j), or i and j get too large and we run out of computing resources. Since the 
reasoning problems taken into account are polynomially intractable, the latter case will 
be frequent, therefore it has to be analyzed very carefully. 
The whole purpose of our research on approximation is the study of how to give a 
meaningful answer in the latter case. We believe that such a meaningful answer has 
to be grounded on a simple semantics and justified by intuitive arguments. In this way 
we want to obtain a comprehensible r asoning system whose precision is arbitrary, but 
depends on the computational effort that has been spent. The system is realized by 
means of a stepwise procedure that can be interrupted at any step in such a way that 
the information obtained so far gives interesting semantic insights. 
In all applications of the above approximation schema presented throughout the paper, 
the lengths n and m of the sequences are linear with respect o the input of the problem. 
Patel-Schneider [ 61,621 and Frisch [ 361 pointed out that Levesque’s ystem suc- 
cessfully managed to lower the complexity of the inference tasks, but it is far too weak 
in sanctioning conclusions to be useful in many situations (see Example 2.2). They 
also argued that Levesque’s weak semantics i  the building block on top of which more 
inferential capabilities hould be added, without losing tractability. This is exactly the 
direction of research we pursue in our work. What we will show is that: 
l a very weak semantics can be used as the starting step of high complexity decision 
problems; 
l on top of this we can define sound and increasingly more complete procedures that 
are based on stronger semantics. 
In the following we also present a dual semantics being stronger than the classical 
one, that will be used as a basis for complete and increasingly more sound reasoning 
procedures. What we gain with our approach is the ability to characterize with a precise 
semantics a wide class of incomplete or unsound inference procedures. 
We proved the flexibility of the method applying it to several reasoning problems very 
popular in knowledge representation. In particular we defined approximation methods 
for: 
( 1) propositional logic; 
(2) fragments of first-order logic (concept description languages); 
(3) propositional default logic and circumscription; 
(4) modal logics. 
Moreover we defined an epistemic language for the representation f resource-bounded 
reasoners. The language provides for a meta-level description of the approximate knowl- 
edge owned by an agent. In the rest of this paper we show all such applications, except 
for approximations of propositional nonmonotonic logics, that we have already analyzed 
in [14]. 
Our method depends on the complexity of the reasoning task only to some extent. The 
complexity of the reasoning problems addressed ranges from NP-complete to PSPACE- 
complete. 
258 M. Schaeti M. Cadoli/Art@cial Intelligence 74 (1995) 249-310 
4. Propositional logic 
In this section we illustrate our approximation technique for entailment in proposi- 
tional logic. In particular we define a method for approximating the set 
UT; Y) I T and Y are propositional formulae and T k y}. 
In Section 4.1 we define the semantics of the approximation. In Section 4.2 we address 
computational aspects and in Section 4.3 we present some examples and discuss the 
method. 
4. I. Semantics 
As we said in the previous section, we are interested both in sound and in complete 
approximations. We first show the sound approximation, which is a generalization of 
Levesque’s shallow reading of sentences (cf. Definition 2.1) . Throughout this section we 
assume that there is an underlying finite alphabet L used for building all the sentences. 
Symbols t and f are used for denoting special propositional letters, which are always 
mapped into I and 0, respectively. In the following we denote with S a subset-possibly 
not proper-of L. 
Definition 4.1 (S-3-interpretation). An S-3-interpretation of L is a truth assignment 
which maps every letter 1 of S and its negation -I into opposite values. Moreover, it 
does not map both a letter I of L \ S and its negation --J into 0. 
According to this definition, for each propositional letter 1 E L and each S-3- 
interpretation I there are the following possibilities: 
(1) f(1) = 1 and 1(-l) =O; 
(2) 1(1) =0 and 1(+ = 1; 
(3) Z(Z) = 1 and 1(~1) = 1 [only if I E L\S]. 
S-3-interpretations are therefore “something in between” standard 2-valued interpreta- 
tions and Levesque’s 3-interpretations. Often we refer to standard 2-valued interpreta- 
tions using the term 2-interpretations. Both 2-interpretations and 3-interpretations are 
generalized by S-3-interpretations, since a 2-interpretation is an S-3-interpretation with 
S = L, while a 3-interpretation is an S-3-interpretation with S = 8. We can say that in 
S-3-interpretations the truth value contradiction is possible only for those letters that do 
not belong to S. 
Interpretations (standard 2-valued interpretations as well as 3-interpretations or S-3- 
interpretation) assign a truth value to an arbitrary formula by means of simple rules. 
First of all, we put formulae in Negation Normal Form (NNF) using the following 
rewriting rules: 
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Now negation occurs in a formula only at the literal level. Rules for assigning truth 
values to NNF formulae are the following: 
0 V-rule: I k Q V p iff I k ff or Z + p; 
l A-rule:Z~=AAiffZ~cuandZ~p. 
A formula is S-3-satisjiable if an S-3-interpretation Z exists such that Z satisfies it, i.e. Z 
maps it into 1. Entailment is defined in the standard way for S-3-entailment: we say that 
T S-3-entails y (written T b=‘, y) iff every S-3-interpretation satisfying T also satisfies y. 
Example 2.2 of Section 2.1 showed that the modus ponens rule does not hold for 
3-entailment. Let us continue that example considering the definitions we just gave. 
Example 4.2 (Sometimes modus ponens holds for S-3-entailment . . .) . Let L be the set 
{a, b}, and T be {a, la V b}. T b b holds and T k3 b does not hold. If S = {a}, then 
T ki b, since every S-3-interpretation satisfying T maps a and b into 1, and ~a into 0. 
( . . . and sometimes it doesn’t). Let L be the set {a, b, c}, S = {a} and T be {a, ~a V 
b, -b V c}. T k c holds, but T b”, c does not hold. 
In the above example the relation /=i is sound and not complete with respect o +. 
We will see in the following that this is a general property of k=“, and we will return 
later on to the possibility of using b=‘, as an approximation of /=. Now we want to deal 
with complete and unsound approximations of b. Such a form of entailment is based 
on the following definition. 
Definition 4.3 (S-l-interpretation). An S-l-interpretation of L is a truth assignment 
which maps every letter 1 of S and its negation 4 into opposite values. Moreover, it 
maps every letter 1 of L \ S and its negation 4 into 0. 
According to this definition, for each propositional etter 1 E L and each S-l- 
interpretation Zthere are the following possibilities: 
(1) Z(Z) = 1 and Z(lI) = 0; 
(2) Z(Z) = 0 and I(+) = 1; 
(3) Z(Z) =0 and I(+ =0 [if and only if 1 E L\S]. 
The reason why every letter 1 of L \ S and its negation 11 are mapped into 0 will be 
clarified shortly. The name S-l-interpretation originates from the fact that for each letter 
1 E L \ S there is exactly one possibility. Intuitively, letters in 1 E L \ S are mapped 
into a truth value which is different from those already seen (tnre, false, contradiction), 
that we might call undefined. Truth assignment for arbitrary formulae is defined in the 
same way we did for S-3-interpretations. Analogously, S-l-entailment (denoted by ki) 
directly follows from that of S-l-interpretation using the same rule. We note that 2- 
interpretations are not S-l-interpretations and vice versa, unless S = L. In the following 
we show an example in which the notions of S-l-interpretation and S-l-entailment are 
used. 
4.2. Computational aspects 
In this subsection we show some properties of S-3- and S-l-entailment hat are im- 
portant from the computational point of view. We denote with T a generic propositional 
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CNF formula and with y a generic propositional clause not containing both a letter 1 
and its negation -1. 
Theorem 4.4 (Monotonicity). For any S and S’ such that S C. S’ Cr L, if T Fi y, then 
T FL, y (hence T p y). Moreover if T bi y, then T f=i, y (hence T f= y). 
Observation 4.5 (Convergence). IfT + y, then there exists an S C L such that T /=i y. 
If T F y then there exists an S C L such that T ki y. 
Theorem 4.6 (Uniform complexity). There exists an algorithm for deciding ifT /=i y 
and deciding if T kk y which runs in 0( ITI Iy( . 21’1) time. 
We notice that Observation 4.5 directly follows from the previous definitions. A set 
S that trivially satisfies its statement is L itself, but we are interested in sets S of 
smaller size. Theorem 4.4 and Observation 4.5 show that the co-NP-complete problem 
of deciding whether T /= y holds can be computed in a stepwise fashion by proving or 
disproving T ki y and T ki y for increasing sets S, starting with S = 8 and stopping 
for the least S C L such that either T p$ y or T ki y hold. 
Referring to the terminology introduced in Section 3 (cf. formula ( l)), we are 
approximating the set 
by means of the two families of sets 
Dl = {(T;Y) I T +;, Y>> D,’ = {(T;Y) I T i=;, ~1. 
In particular an approximation is defined by two increasing sequences of sets 
(Sl)=0c~“cS;c~“cS,,,=L), 
The above results do not tell us for which set S we are going to have a definite answer 
to the query T /= y. Theorem 4.6 tells us that, even in the worst case (i.e. when we 
prove or disprove T + y for S = L), the complexity of the method is 0( ITI . IyI . 21Ll), 
hence similar to the best-known algorithms for deciding T k y. 
Notice that if we change Definition 4.3 so that an S-l-interpretation I satisfies the 
weaker requirement 
(3’) 1(1) =0 and I(-I) =0 [only if It L\S], 
then deciding whether T kk y would be a co-NP-complete problem for all sets S. As 
a matter of fact, T +i f iff T is not S-l-satisfiable, and T would be S-l-satisfiable, 
according to the revised definition, iff T is classically (2-valued) satisfiable. 
The method for deciding propositional entailment can be stopped for any S C L, and 
in this case the time spent in the computation has provided clear semantical information. 
Propositional entailment is computed in a step-wise fashion, and the parameter S controls 
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the quality of the inference. The precision of the inference is arbitrary and depends on 
the computational effort that has been spent. If ISI is limited by a logarithmic function, 
then the resulting inference is polynomial. This is a typical approximation process, since 
every intermediate step provides a partial solution whose relation to the final solution 
(the error) is clearly identified. 
We have therefore reached our goal of defining a method for approximation of the 
consequence relation in propositional logic such that: 
l it is semantically founded; 
l approximate answers are easier to compute than the answers to the original inference 
problem; 
l approximate answers can be improved, and converge to the right answer (provided 
we have enough resources and motivation) ; 
l both only sound and only complete approximations are provided. 
In the rest of the paper we show methods for approximating other reasoning tasks. 
All such methods are supported by results analogous to Theorems 4.4 and 4.6 and 
Observation 4.5. 
Results analogous to Theorems 4.4 and 4.6 and Observation 4.5 hold for S-l- and 
S-3-satisfiability problems. This will be the topic of Section 5. 
All the results just shown (and in particular Theorem 4.6) hold even if T is a NNF 
formula and y is a generic formula in CNF. This aspect has been analyzed in [ 151, 
where we showed other normal forms for which the uniform complexity result holds. 
4.3. Discussion and examples 
In this subsection we perform some informal considerations on the meaning of the 
entailment relations we defined. Let’s start considering two examples. 
Example 4.7 (Proving a consequence). We assume that the following CNF formula T 
is part of a very large knowledge base containing information about animals and their 
properties. T uses a small alphabet L, which we assume to be part of a larger dictionary. 
The large knowledge base contains a taxonomy of classes, which is partially present in 
T. 
L = { cow, dog, grass-eater, carnivore, mammal, has-canine-teeth, 
has-molar-teeth, vertebrate, animal); 
T = (-cow V grass-eater), 
(‘dog V carnivore), 
(lgrass-eater V lhas-canine-teeth) , 
(Tgrass-eater V mammal), 
(lcamivore V mammal), 
(-mammal V has-canine-teeth V has-molar-teeth), 
(~mummal V vertebrate), 
( -wertebrate V animal). 
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Notice that T is not a Horn formula. We want to prove that T f= (lcowvhas-molar-teeth) 
holds. Since T p3 (--cow V has-molar-teeth), we try to determine a subset S of L such 
that T /==i (xow V has-molar-teeth) holds. By Theorem 4.4 this is sufficient for our 
goal. In fact, this happens when S = {grass-eater, mammal, has-canine-teeth}, which is 
a small subset of the whole dictionary. 
Example 4.8 (Disproving a consequence). 
L = {person, child, youngster, adult, senior, student,pensioner, 
worker, unemployed}; 
T = (-person V child V youngster V adult V senior), 
(-youngster V student V worker), 
(xdult V student V worker V unemployed), 
( lsenior V pensioner V worker), 
(-student V child V youngster V adult), 
( Ipensioner V senior), 
( Ipensioner V lstudent) , 
(Ipensioner V lworker) 
We want to prove that T p ( xhild V pensioner). By Theorem 4.4 we try to de- 
termine a subset S of L such that T k: (Tchild V pensioner). In fact this happens 
when S = {child, worker, pensioner} since the S- 1 -interpretation mapping child, worker, 
Ipensioner into 1 and all the other literals into 0 satisfies T but not (xhildvpensioner) . 
Let us give a qualitative analysis of the above examples. In the first example, in which 
taxonomic knowledge is present, it seems that in order to reach an exact solution it is 
useful to include in the set S concepts of the taxonomy which are superclasses of the 
concepts occurring in the query. As for the second example, in which the knowledge is 
spread over several indefinite clauses, an useful strategy seems to be that of extending S 
with classes with several properties, such as pensioner, or properties shared by several 
classes, such as worker. 
From the intuitive point of view, both S-3-interpretation and S-l-interpretation cor- 
respond to a representation in which only some of the propositional letters are “taken 
seriously”, while others are ignored. This leads to an entailment relation that models 
a way of reasoning in which part of the knowledge (the knowledge represented by 
letters not in the set S) is ignored on purpose. S-3- and S-l-entailment are therefore 
mechanisms for creating partial views of the knowledge base. 
S-3-entailment and s-l-entailment differ with respect to the treatment of the letters 
that are ignored. In particular in S-3-entailment we don’t care if ignoring letters leads 
to contradictions, i.e. a knowledge base T may have plausible states (S-3-models) that 
do not correspond to ordinary models. This proliferation of admissible states makes 
it “harder” (logically, not computationally) to prove entailment, i.e. S-3-entailment is 
sound and not complete with respect to classical entailment. 
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We claim that S-3-entailment models a deductive strategy that is sometimes applied in 
reality. Let us see this with an example, paraphrasing Example 4.7. We are consulting an 
encyclopedia bout animals, looking for particular information, let’s say whether cows 
have molar teeth or not. It is natural to start our research from the paragraph about cows, 
then to broaden the scope more and more, taking into account he section on herbivores, 
the chapter on mammals, the volume on vertebrates, . . . . During this process it may 
happen that we find a term that we do not understand, because it is defined in a part 
that we did not read. Anyway we continue until we are able to answer the question or 
we run out of resources (time, motivation, . . .). We are performing two different forms 
of local reasoning: (1) only a part of the knowledge base is taken into account and 
(2) only a part of the alphabet is taken into account. While performing this research, 
we assume that the information not yet considered can be ignored, in the sense that if 
we prove that cows actually have molar teeth by considering only little information or 
a small part of the alphabet, then such an answer is definitely exact. Ignoring a part of 
the knowledge base (i.e. the first aspect of local reasoning) can be trivially modeled. 
On the other hand S-3-entailment models the second aspect of local reasoning: the set 
S represents the terms that “make sense” to us. Broadening the scope of our research is 
modeled by making the set S larger and larger. 
As far as the S-l-entailment relation is concerned, dual considerations hold. Also in 
this case we deal with a form of local reasoning, but the information which is ignored 
is considered in a pessimistic way. In other words we think that the information we 
are currently holding is useful only for disproving, and not for proving. This leads to 
dramatic reduction of the admissible states of a knowledge base (i.e. its S-l-models), 
hence it is possible to accept as a consequence what is not really a consequence (9 l- 
entailment is complete and unsound with respect o 2-entailment). 
Summing up, both relations for approximate entailment can model agents with limited 
resources. The difference is in that they have different attitudes with respect o what is 
outside the scope of the agents’ competence. 
Examples 4.7 and 4.8 show that an exact solution to an entailment problem can be 
reached with a small S. The choice of the minimal set S having this property may 
not be easy in general. If we knew the minimum size of a set S for which T b=“, y or 
T k: y holds, then we would know that an upper bound for the entailment problem is 
0( ITI - Iy] e 29. 
A natural question is therefore the following: is approximation of propositional en- 
tailment only a theoretical method, or do we have a technique for choosing a set S of 
letters for which we have high expectation of having correct answers? Moreover, how 
much can we trust an approximate answer? What kind of “degree of belief’ can we 
associate to it? 
There are several ways to give answers to this kind of questions. For example we 
could look for “good” sets S using purely syntactic techniques, like using topological 
criteria in suitable representations of the formula as a graph. Another possibility relying 
on syntactic methods is to use parameters uch as the number of occurrences of a 
single literal in the formula. Techniques of this kind have actually been used by several 
researchers for providing smart methods for solving computationally hard problems (see 
for example [ 241 in the area of constraint propagation). Moreover several heuristics for 
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an intelligent choice of the letters to be used in resolution algorithms (see for example 
[ 571) or in Davis-Putnam’s procedure for propositional satisfiability (see for example 
[46] ) have been developed. Another possibility is to use numerical parameters for the 
attribution of a degree of confidence to an approximate answer. 
In our work we preferred to use a logical language for addressing the questions 
reported above. We deal with these aspects in Section 6, where preliminary answers 
have been given in the framework of epistemic logic. Our goal has been to provide a 
meta-level language for the representation of approximate knowledge, as specified by 
the logical relations presented in this section. This meta-level knowledge can be used 
for a smart choice of the set S. 
Techniques defined by other authors-apart from those addressed in Section 2- 
share ideas with our method. For example Giunchiglia and Walsh’s abstract proofs 
method [40] give logical description of only sound as well as only complete forms 
of approximate reasoning. Related ideas can also be found in Imielinski’s work on 
domain abstraction [44] and in general in the area of abstract interpretation, born 
in the programming languages community [ 181. Gal10 and ScutellB’s method [ 371, 
modified by Dalal and Etherington in [21], defines classes of propositional formulae 
whose associated satisfiability problem is more and more computationally demanding. 
Dalal’s k-consistency [ 201 is similar to this respect. 
Our method differs significantly from all the above techniques. 
All the results presented in this section will be proved in Appendix A. 1. 
The ideas shown in this section have been presented in a preliminary form in [ 11 I. 
5. Algorithms to compute S-entailment 
The goal of this section is to discuss algorithmic aspects of S-3- and S-l-entailment. 
Taking into account that T k y holds iff T U (1~) is unsatisfiable-i.e. for 2-valued 
semantics entailment can be reduced to unsatisfiability-in the first subsection we de- 
velop methods for testing S-l- and S-3-entailment based on S-l- and S-3_unsatisfiability, 
respectively. In the second subsection we focus on the development of an algorithm for 
checking S-l- and S-3-satisfiability of a formula. 
5.1. Reducing S-entailment to S-unsatisfiability 
In this subsection we use the symbol y to denote a clause. First of all, we can 
immediately reduce S-unsatisfiability to S-entailment, since a formula T is S-l-satisfiable 
if and only if T kk f, and T is S-3-satisfiable if and only if T ki f. 
As for the reverse reduction, we introduce a set describing the clause y. 
Definition 5.1. We denote with letters(y) the set (1 E L 1 1 occurs in y} U (1 E L 1 
-1 occurs in y}. 
The next lemma shows that, when dealing with S-3-entailment, we can safely choose 
an S such that letters(y) C S. 
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Lemma 5.2. Suppose letters(y) g S holds. Let S’ be the set S U letters(y). T bz y 
holds iff T k=“,, y holds. 
The next two theorems how that S-l- and S-3-entailment can be reduced to S-l- and 
S-3_unsatisfiability, respectively. 
Theorem 5.3 (Reducing S-l-entailment o S-1-unsatisfiability). Let y be ysv%, where 
both letters( ys) C S and letters(q) fl S = 0 hold. T & y holds iff T u (7~s) is not 
S- 1 -satisfiable. 
Theorem 5.4 (Reducing S-3-entailment to S-3-unsatisfiability). Let letters(y) & S 
hold. T k=‘, y holds i#T U (1~) is not S-3-satisjiable. 
The above theorems how that the problem of testing S-3-entailment [ S-l-entailment] 
can be reduced to the problem of deciding S-3-unsatisfiability [ S-1-unsatisfiability] 
of a suitable formula. This extends the well-known relation existing between classical 
entailment and unsatisfiability. The importance of such a result is in that S-3-satisfiability 
[ S-1-satisfiability] of a CNP formula T can be tested in the following way: 
( 1) replace by t [ f] all occurrences (both positive and negative) in T of letters 
which belong to L \ S, thus obtaining the formula T: [ Tj ] ; 
(2) test standard (2-valued) satisfiability of Tz [ Ti 1. 
The transformation shown in point (1) preserves S-3- and 9l-satisfiability for NNP 
formulae as well (see [ 151). We notice that only letters which belong to S occur in 
Ti and Ti. As a consequence simple algorithms for deciding S-l- and S-3-satisfiability 
and running in time 0( ITI . 21’1) can be obtained directly from classic algorithms 
for satisfiability like Davis and Putnam’s [ 221 or Robinson’s [ 631. Nevertheless very 
specialized algorithms for propositional satisfiability (e.g. Van Gelder’s [ 721) can be 
used without loss of efficiency for computing S-l- .or S-3-satisfiability. 
We want to stress that we are not proposing a new algorithm or heuristic for the 
satisfiability problem, but we are instead interested in a semantic description of par- 
tial reasoning. We claim that many heuristics commonly used for the satisfiability 
problem can be applied in our method as well, since we are able to reduce the re- 
lations for approximate ntailment o ordinary (2-valued) satisfiability of a smaller 
formula. 
In the next subsection we show custom algorithms for deciding S-l- and S-3- 
satisfiability. 
We now present some simple observations leading to significant simplifications of the 
formulae whose S-l- and S-3-unsatisfiability we must check in order to prove S-l- and 
S-3-entailment. 
We define an operation on formulae; we say that 0 = simplify( r, S), where 0 and r 
are CNP formulae and S is a set or a conjunction of literals, if 0 is obtained from r 
through the following steps: 
( 1) delete all clauses of r that contain a literal occurring in 6; 
(2) in any clause /3 of r delete all literals 1 whose negation -1 occurs in 6. 
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This operation can be done in 0( Irl . (81) t’ ime. Notice that no literal p of S or its 
negation lp occur in 0. Moreover, the simplified CNF formula 0 is always smaller 
than the original formula r, since some of the clauses of the latter disappeared, and 
some of the remaining clauses contain less literals. We can now prove a simple result 
about simplified formulae, stating that the simplifying process does not lead to loss of 
information. 
Theorem 5.5 (Simplifying). Let 6 be a set of literals such that letters( 8) C S holds 
and both a letter 1 and its negation 4 do not occur in S; simplify( T, S) is S- 1 -satisjable 
iff T U S is S- 1 -satisfiable. In addition, simpl@( T, 8) is S-3-satisfiable iff T U 8 is S-3- 
satisjable. 
The above theorem is intuitive when S = L holds, that is, for the 2-valued logic. 
By taking into account Theorems 5.3 and 5.4, the above result shows that, in order to 
prove whether T pl y and T +: y holds, we can focus our attention on S-1-satisfiability 
of simplify( T, -ys) and on S-3-unsatisfiability of simplify( T, ly), respectively. The role 
of simplification of T is that of reducing its dimensions, thus gaining efficiency in the 
whole process of determining the validity of the entailment relation b. Anyway, the 
simplification can be done if the following hypotheses hold: 
( 1) y is not a tautology; 
(2) letters(y) & S [only for pi]. 
Since checking entailment of tautologies is a trivial problem, the first hypothesis can be 
assumed without loss of generality. Lemma 5.2 shows that also the second hypothesis 
can be assumed without loss of generality. 
5.2. Algorithms for testing S-satisjability 
As we showed in the previous subsection, testing S-entailment can always be reduced 
to testing S-satisfiability. In this subsection we focus on the development of an algorithm 
for checking S-l- and S-3-satisfiability. In the first part we show the relations existing 
between S-satisfiability and well-known algorithms for satisfiability. In the second part 
we design an original algorithm. 
5.2.1. Resolution and enumeration 
Satisfiability of CNF formulae is a very well-known problem in 2-valued propositional 
logic, extensively studied and discussed in the specialized literature. Here we focus on 
two of the major types of algorithms for satisfiability: 
( 1) Resolution-based algorithms (e.g. [ 631): they try to prove unsatisfiability of a 
formula T by deriving the empty clause from it. If the empty clause cannot be 
derived, then T is satisfiable. 
(2) Enumeration-based algorithms (e.g. [ 221) : they try to prove satisfiability of a 
formula T by generating an interpretation which satisfies T. If such an interpre- 
tation is not found, then T is unsatisfiable. 
The first type of algorithms is more directed to proving unsatisfiability, hence we expect 
them to be well suited to check S-3_unsatisfiability, while we expect the latter ones 
to be well suited to check S-l-satisfiability. We now state formally the correspondence 
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between these algorithms and the checks we are interested in. In the following we denote 
with Cl the empty clause, and with 0 the CNF formula with no clauses. 
In order to show the link existing between S-satisfiability and resolution-based algo- 
rithms, we introduce a family of CNF formulae T’ ( 1 < i < m), defined as follows (we 
denote with {at,. . . , a,} the set S): 
T’+’ = {X 1 3~1, y2 E T’ and x is the resolvent of yt and y2 upon ai+t } 
U {X 1 x E T’, ui+l $ x and TUi+t $ x}. 
The CNF formula T’ ( 1 < i < m) is the conjunction of all the resolvents at the ith level 
of the resolution tree having T as the root and which have been produced by resolving 
upon all the literals in {at,. . . , Ui} in any order. Notice that T’ has 0( 2’) times the 
number of clauses T has. Notice also that no literal of {at,. . . , Ui} occurs in T’. The 
next theorem shows how S-satisfiability of a CNF formula T can be computed using the 
resolution method. 
Theorem 5.6 (S-satisfiability and resolution). A formulu T is S-3-sutisjkble iff Tm is 
S-3-sutisJiable i$ •i # T”‘. A formulu T is S-l-sutisjiuble iff T* is S-1-sutisjkble iff 
Tm = R 
Similar considerations enable us to relate S-satisfiability of a CNF formula T to the 
Davis-Putnam algorithm for checking satisfiability [22]. For this aim we introduce a 
family @’ ( 1 6 i < m) of sets of CNF formulae defined as follows: 
Q” = {T}; 
@+’ = {W 1 3H E d and W = simplify(H, {ui+l})} 
U {W 1 3H E d and W = simplify(H, {lui+l})}. 
The family @ ( 1 < i < m) is the set of all the CNF formulae H obtained by simplifying 
T with any set of literals representing a 2-interpretation f the letters in {at, . . . , ui}a In 
the generation of @+’ any formula H belonging to @ is replaced by the two formulae 
simplify( H, {ui+l}) and simplify( H, {lui+l}). Notice that @ has 2’ CNF formulae, each 
being smaller than T. 
Theorem 5.7 (S-satisfiability and Davis-Putnam algorithm). A formula T is S-3-sutis- 
jiuble iff there exists a H E @” that is S-3-sutisjiable; H is S-3-suti@able iff 0 $! H. 
A formula T is S-1-satisjable ifl there exists a H E @“’ that is S-1-sutis$uble; H is 
S-1-sutisjable iff H = 0. 
The possibility of using Theorems 5.6 and 5.7 for making an appropriate choice of 
the set S will be discussed shortly. 
5.2.2. The algorithm 
We briefly sketch our desiderata bout an algorithm for testing S-satisfiability: 
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l The algorithm must compute at the same time both S-1-satisfiability and S-3- 
unsatisfiability of a generic formula. 
l It should benefit from previous computations. In other words, if for a given S, T is 
still S-l-unsatisfiable and S-3-satisfiable, we probably want to try with a set S’ 3 
S. In principle this may happen after hours or days, depending on our computing 
resources; therefore we want our algorithm to compute satisfiability incrementally, 
using information gained in previous steps. 
l Although we expect the algorithm to run in time exponential in ]SI, we want the 
algorithm to use polynomial space. 
By taking into account that we want to accommodate a stepwise extension of the set S, 
an important issue for an efficient algorithm is that this extension does not require to 
perform all the computations from scratch. In other words, some form of history must 
be kept from the past computations. 
Theorems 5.6 and 5.7 provide a semantics, based on S-3-unsatisfiability and on S-l- 
satisfiability respectively, for each step of the algorithms for satisfiability based on the 
resolution principle and on enumeration of truth assignments. These two theorems also 
provide the basis for straightforward algorithms for checking S-3-unsatisfiability and 
S-1-satisfiability. Simply by generating the CNF formula T”’ we can determine at the 
same time S-3-unsatisfiability and S-l -satisfiability of the formula T simply by checking 
whether T”’ contains 0 or T” is equal to a, in the same way this can be done through 
the generation of the set of formulae @“I. Moreover, both algorithms are incremental: if 
for a given S and T is still S-l-unsatisfiable and S-3-satisfiable and we take into account 
the set S’ = S U {ant+, }, then, in order to compute T”+l, we only need Tm; in the same 
way, in order to compute @“‘+I we only need @“I. These two algorithms fulfill our first 
two desiderata, but unfortunately they fail to accomplish the third one, because both 
algorithms use an amount of space which grows exponentially with the size of S. 
This is particularly evident in the Davis-Putnam algorithm. In fact, we can perform 
both checks using a polynomially-bounded amount of space if we generate every com- 
bination 6 = {cl,. . . , c,,}, where each c; (1 < i < m) is either ai or Tai, one at the 
time. S- I -satisfiability is proven when we find a 8 such that simplify( T, 6) = L?. On 
the other hand, S-3-unsatisfiability is proven if for all 6 we have that simpli&( T, S) 
contains the clause Cl. This procedure fulfills the first and the third desiderata, but fails 
to fulfill the second one, since when we take into account a set S’ = S U {a,+,} we are 
not able to exploit the previous computations and we must generate each combination 
{Cl). . . 1 cm, cm+1 ).
Let us summarize all the above results and considerations about the relationships 
existing between S-satisfiability and classic algorithms for satisfiability. If the search tree 
of the resolution [Davis-Putnam] algorithm is visited breadth-first, resolving [splitting] 
on the letters of S in any order, then S-satisfiability “is the same as” satisfiability. Anyway 
in common implementations of resolution or Davis-Putnam methods the search tree is 
visited depth-first, using polynomial space. Therefore the possibility of using specialized 
heuristics-developed for selecting variables to resolve or split on-for making an 
appropriate choice of the set S is limited. 
A further possibility for determining S- 1- and S-3-satisfiability is to reduce T to Ti and 
Ti, respectively, as sketched in the previous subsection, and check their 2-satisfiability. 
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These reductions may simplify the computations, but they force us to work on two 
different formulae, thus making difficult the integration of the checks. Furthermore, it is 
not clear how to make these computations incremental, since the reduced formulae i$ 
and Ti vary with the set S. 
Our analysis has shown that all of the above algorithms fail to fulfill all of the desider- 
ata, hence, we now develop an enumeration algorithm for performing the satisfiability 
check based on the following properties. 
Algorithm S-3-unsat/S-l-sat; 
Input an alphabet L, a subset S = {al, . . , a,} of 15, a CNF formula T 
andanintegerji,suchthatO<j <(2+‘-I); \ L” 1 
Output true, iff T is S-l-satisfiable, false iff T is S-3-unsatisfiable, 
an integer jO.t such that 0 < j,,“t < (2m - 1) otherwise; 
begin 
if there is a clause of T that does not contain at least one literal of S 
then S-1-unsat := true (* then T cannot be S-l-satisfiable *) 
else S-l-unsat := false; (* else T could be S-l-satisfiable *) 
S-l -sat := false; (* S-l-sat is false until we prove S-1-satisfiability *)
S-3-unsat := true; (* S-3-unsat is true until we prove S-3-satisfiability *)
exit := false; (* this flag is used to control the loop *) 
j := 0; 
while (j < 2’9 and (not exit) 
do begin 
let dl . . . d,,, be the binary coding of j; (* d,,, is the least significant bit *) 
for i := 1 to m do (* computation of a combination of literals *) 
ifdi=l 
then Ci := ai 
else Ci := -@; 
if (j 2 2 * jin) and (S-3-unsat) 
thenifTp3 (cl V...Vc,) 
then begin 
S-3-unsat := false; 
. . 
Joa := J 
if S-1-unsat (* T is both S-3-satisfiableand S-l-unsatisfiable *) 
then exit := true; (* hence we exit the loop *) 
end; 
if not S-1-unsat 
then if simplify( T; {cl, . . . , cm}) contains no clauses 
then begin 
S- 1 -sat := true; ( * T is S- 1 -satisfiable *) 
exit := true (* hence we exit the loop *) 
end; 
j:=j+l 
end; (* while *) 
if S-l-sat then return true; 
if S-3-unsat then return false 
else return j,,, 
end; 
Fig. 1. The algorithm S-3-unsat/S-l-sat. 
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Theorem 5.8 (Testing S-3-satisfiability). Let S be the set {al,. . . , ant}. T is S-3-unsat- 
isjiable iffT k3 (al Anal) V.. .V(a,,A~a,,) holds, or equivalently T k3 (cl v.. .vc,,) 
holds for any combination {cl, . . , c,,}, where each ci ( 1 6 i 6 m) is either ai or Tai. 
Theorem 5.9 (Testing S- 1-satisfiability). Let S be the set {al,. . . , a,,}. T is S-l-satis- 
fiable iff there exists a set CY = {cl,. . , c,,}, where each ci (1 < i < m) is either ai or 
~a;, such that simpliJL(T, a) is empty. 
The basic idea of the algorithm is that, given any set S = {al,. . , a,,,}, at any step 
we generate a combination cy = {ci , . . . , c,,} of literals such that each ci (1 < i < m) 
is either a; or ~a;. To generate all the combinations {cl,. . . , c,,} we use the binary 
coding of an integer j varying between 0 and 2”’ - 1. If simplify(T, a) is empty then 
T is S-l-satisfiable. Conversely, if T F3 (cl V . V cm), then T is S-3-satisfiable. In 
the first case we have a definite answer, while in the second case we can stop our 
check of S-3unsatisfiability. Notice that, if {cl,. . . , c,,} is the first combination such 
that T p3 (cl V V c,,) holds, then for any other combination {gi, . , g,l} previously 
generated, T k3 (gl V. . .Vg,,) holds. If S’ = SU{a,+i } is the next set that we consider, 
we already know that T k=” (gl V V g,, V Tan,+1 ) and T k3 (gl V . . . V g,, V a,,] ) . 
Hence, in order to prove S’-3_satisfiability, we can start to generate combinations from 
{Cl>. , c,,, ~a~,+1 }. Therefore, the combination {cl, . . , c,} represents the history of 
our computation and is provided as an output through an integer jout, which will be 
used as an input of the next call of the algorithm. In the same way, we suppose to have 
the integer ji, as input, representing the history of the previous call. Notice that if every 
clause of T does not contain at least one literal of S, then T is clearly S-l-unsatisfiable, 
therefore we do not need to generate its simplifications. 
The algorithm is reported in Fig. 1. In this algorithm we assume that the set S is 
incremented of a single unit at any step, its generalization is obvious. 
We notice that, if we restrict the algorithm to check S-3-unsatisfiability and we extend 
S through successive calls to the algorithm, then the number of checks of 3-entailment 
is less than or equal to 21Ll. 
All the results presented in this section will be proved in Appendix A.2. 
6. Approximate reasoning and non-omniscient agents 
This section is an attempt at formalizing the form of approximate propositional reason- 
ing introduced in Section 4 by means of a modal logic of knowledge. In the remaining 
Sections 7 and 8 we provide further applications of the approximation presented in 
Section 3. 
Modal logics are probably the most widely used formalism to represent propositional 
attitudes, such as knowledge and belief, held by agents. For a detailed account of this 
usage of modal logics we refer to Hintikka’s work [43]. 
One of the best-known shortcomings of this representation of agents is that agents 
represented through modal theories are ascribed the capability to infer any logical conse- 
quence of their knowledge (or belief). In other words, we make the unrealistic assump- 
tion that agents are capable of performing extremely complex inferences. This drawback 
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is known as the logical omniscience problem (see [43] ). 
Technically, logical omniscience is a consequence of the possible-worlds emantics 
commonly used [ 43,5 11 as the semantics for logics of knowledge and belief. General- 
izations of the possible-worlds emantics have been proposed to overcome the logical 
omniscience problem (for a detailed survey see [42] ). 
In the following we assume that the reader has some familiarity with modal ogics and 
its best-known systems. We only want to remind that modal systems can be characterized 
either by a set of axiom schemata or by the corresponding constraints on the accessibility 
relation. A detailed description of the various modal systems can be found in the book 
by Chellas [ 161. 
In this section we present a very general system, where “approximate” knowledge 
can be explicitly represented and used; this system is also compared with some of the 
formalisms presented in the literature. 
The main idea underlying the system consists in providing language constructs for 
representing the kind of approximation implicit in the entailment relations +i and ki 
defined in Section 4. The system consists of two families of modal operators related 
to the notion of S-interpretation, where the elements of the first family are denoted as 
0: and the elements of the second family as 0;. Formulae are built using the usual 
connectives and the two sets of modal operators 0: and 0: for any S C L. 
Formulae of the language are built over a set of literals L* using the binary connectives 
A and V, the modal operators 0: and Cl:, their negation -0: and -0: plus parentheses. 
In the following, we refer to formulae in this form as Modal Negation Norm& Form 
(MNNF) . This restriction does not cause any loss of generality since any formula can 
be transformed into an equivalent one in MNNF by substituting implication + and by 
pushing negation inside the formulae, by means of the rules presented in Section 4 and 
the following rules: 
(ecu)* H cia*; 
(loa)* H 7clLy*. 
When we discuss the semantics of general formulae we implicitly refer to their MNNF 
equivalent formula. Formulae not containing the modal operator are called simply propo- 
sitional. 
The semantics is a generalization of the classical possible-worlds semantics. A model 
is a triple M = (Sit, R, V), where Sit is a set of situations, R is an accessibility relation, 
and V a valuation, which maps any situation into an unrestricted truth assignment 
(V:Sit+ (L* --+ {O,l})). W e d enote with W(Sit) the set of situations E Sit such 
that s is also a possible world, i.e. V(s) is a 2-interpretation. Similarly, we denote with 
S-3( Sit) and S-l (Sit) the sets of situations that can be interpreted as S-3- and S-l- 
interpretations, respectively. The semantics is defined as follows (y is a propositional 
formula) :
l M,s +y iff V(s)(y) = 1; 
l M, s + q $ iff Vt E S-3(Sit)sRt implies M, t k a; 
l M, s + 7 0: LY iff 3 E S-3(Sit)sRt and M, t F a; 
l M, s + q $x iff Vt E S-l(Sit)sRt implies M, t k a; 
. M,s k-0: (Y iff 3 E S-l(Sit)sRt and M, t k a; 
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A formula cx is valid, written b LY, if (Y is true at every possible world w E W(Sit) 
of every model M = (Sit, R, V). A formula (Y is satisfiable if there is a model M = 
(Sit, R, V) and a possible world w E W(Sit) s.t. M, w b CT. 
We notice that negation of modal formulae is defined in a classical fashion. In fact 
both Cl@ A 7 0: (Y and O&X A 1 q l!s LY are unsatisfiable. 
A minimal requirement for the system is its ability to represent he entailment relations 
+i and ki via the modal operators 0: and 0:. This is in fact possible, as proven by 
the following result (a and y are propositional formulae): 
Theorem 6.1 (Modal validity and S-3-entailment). (+ 0$x + 03,~) i~(O~cy~~Cl~y 
is unsatisjiable) i# ( LY +i y). 
Theorem 6.2 (Modal validity and S-l-entailment). ( + 0;~ + C&y) ifs ( •I$xA~O~~ 
is unsatisjiable) i# (cr ki y). 
Hence, the proposed language can represent the approximate entailment relations. In 
order to make our system comparable with the modal system S5 (see [ 161)) which is 
generally considered as an appropriate formalization of the notion of knowledge (see 
[ 431) , in the following we assume that the accessibility relation R is reflexive, transitive 
and euclidean. 
It is now interesting to check whether the schemata defining the system S5 are valid 
for these new operators, in order to show their adequacy to represent resource-bounded 
agents. 
The system S5 is characterized by the usual rules and axiom schemata of the propo- 
sitional calculus plus the inference rule (necessitation): 
(Net) + (Y implies b Kcu. 
and the axiom schemata: 
(K) K(a--,p) + (Ka+KP). 
(T) Ka + a. 
(4) Ka -+KKa. 
(5) -Ka -+ K~KcY. 
We now analyze which of these schemata are valid in our semantics when we replace 
K with 0:. The result is the following: 
(Net) b (Y does not imply /= q $. 
(K) I= q ;(a + P) --f (@ --+ q $P). 
(T) F O&X + cy. 
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The validity of the schemata 4 and 5 is a straightforward consequence of the properties 
of the accessibility relation, while the schema K follows from the semantic definition of 
0:. We now show counterexamples for the properties which do not hold. 
(Net) Letcu=qV~q,S=$,M=(Sir,R,V),Sit={sl,sz},R={(sl,sl), (sl,s2), 
(s~,sI), (~z,~z)}, V(sl)(q) = 1 and V(sl)(y~) = V(sz)(q) = V(s2)(+ =O. Notice 
that W(Sit) = (~1). W e h ave 
M,st p q ;C.Y. 
that /= LY holds but k q $Y does not hold, in fact 
(T) Let S = 8, M = (Sit,R,V), Sit = {sI}, R = {(sl,s~)}, V(sl)(lp) = 1 and 
V(Q)(~) = 0. Notice that W(W) = (~1). Oip + p is valid iff VN VW E W(Sit) 
N, w k 10; p V N, w b p. Since by instantiating N to M and w to st we obtain that 
M, s1 p 1 Clip and M, s1 k p then it is not the case that $.I + LY is valid. 
We have shown that both the rule of necessitation and the axiom schema T do not hold 
in general. As a consequence we can use 0: to model an agent capable of performing 
at least every sound inference, because its knowledge is closed under modus ponens 
(the K schema), nevertheless, the agent can do some inference which is not sound, in 
fact the T schema does not hold. Since both schemata 4 and 5 are valid, it follows that 
agents modeled in our system are fully introspective. Even if the necessitation rule and 
the T schema do not hold in general they are valid whenever letters(o) C S, so they 
still hold for a subset of the language. 
We now analyze which schemata re valid in our semantics when we replace K with 
Cl;. 
Again, the schemata 4 and 5 are a straightforward consequence of the properties of 
the accessibility relation, while the schema T and the rule Net follow from the semantic 
definition of 0:. We now show a counterexample for the property K. Let S = 0, 
M = (Sit, R, V), Sit = {sl,s~}, R = {( sl,sl>,(sl,s2),(s2,sl)r(S2,S2)}, V(Sl)(P) = 
V(a)(q) = V(SZ)(P) = V(s2)(7p) = V(s2)(-q) = 1 and V(~)(T) = V(sl)(-d = 
V(sz)(q) = 0. Notice that W(W) = (~1). We have that M,sl + q ‘,(p -+ q) and 
M, SI + Clip but M, s1 + q liq does not hold. 
Even this set of modal operators does not satisfy all the rules and axiom schemata 
of S5. In this case the only property which is not satisfied is property K, that is the 
closure of the knowledge under modus ponens. This implies that an agent modeled with 
these operators is not committed to full logical omniscience. Its deductive capabilities 
are limited, but its inferences are always sound, as witnessed by the validity of the T 
schema. Again properties 4 and 5 continue to hold thus providing the agent with perfect 
introspection. Since Cl: is an approximation of K, it is clear that whenever the set S is 
equal to L the two operators coincide and therefore 0: will satisfy exactly the same 
properties of K, including the K schema. But this schema is also satisfied under weaker 
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conditions, if LY is a propositional formula we have that q li( LY + p) + ( q $X + q $) 
is valid if and only if (Y A T(Y is S-3-unsatisfiable. 
There are other interesting properties which involve different sets S, for example we 
have that 
Theorem 6.3 (Monotonicity for 0:). Let S C: S’ C: L. k q ~cy + Cl:, a. 
We claim that the two sets of operators 0; and 0: account for a non-ideal reasoner 
with a limited amount of resources. The first set of operators accounts for a skeptical 
reasoner, while the second set accounts for a credulous one. We can now model an 
agent’s reasoning capabilities avoiding the logical omniscience assumption and providing 
a set of semantically motivated restrictions to its deductive capabilities. In particular, 
we claim that our system can be used for modeling the interaction of several non-ideal 
agents, each having its own attitude-either credulous or skeptical-and competence, 
characterized by the set S. 
It is commonplace that knowledge about the structure of a knowledge base can be very 
useful in the choice of an efficient query-answering strategy. In general, the knowledge 
engineer who creates a knowledge base is aware of some knowledge about its structure. 
If we can design a language well suited to represent this kind of knowledge, then 
we can take advantage of it when the system is asked to answer queries. While the 
importance to represent this information is generally acknowledged, very little has been 
done in practice in order to achieve this goal. 
We show how the proposed language can be (sometimes) useful to represent in- 
formation about the knowledge base. As an example, the knowledge engineer of the 
knowledge base T, which contains knowledge about animals, may know that, in order 
to decide whether cows have molar teeth, it is sufficient to take into account only the 
properties of herbivores. This information can be modeled by a formula like: 
[T 4 (cow + molar-teeth)] + [ q iT --+ q l~(cow --+ molar-teeth)] 
for a suitable set S of propositional letters, for example all letters expressing properties 
of the herbivores. The intuitive reading of the above formula is: if it holds that cows 
have molar teeth, then we can prove it using only S-3-entailment, for a fixed S. In the 
query-answering process this meta-knowledge should be automatically used to perform 
an “intelligent” choice of the set S which guarantees an high degree of confidence (cf. 
end of Section 4). 
The specification of actual procedures for taking advantage of structural knowledge 
represented in this meta-language deserves further investigation. 
Several other systems capable of representing non-omniscient agents have been pre- 
sented in the literature. We now briefly compare our system with some of the best-known 
formalisms. 
In Levesque’s system [ 541 the semantics of the modal operator of implicit belief L is 
defined in terms of possible worlds. Conversely, the modal operator of explicit belief B 
is defined in terms of situations. Both operators can be represented in our semantics and 
with our operators, in fact, L is equivalent to 0; or 0; when S = L and B is equivalent 
to 0; when S = 8. Hence, O$r has the intuitive reading of “a can be made explicit by 
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reasoning only on letters in S’. 
Lakemeyer [531 has extended Levesque’s ystem, allowing a restricted form of nesting 
of operators. However, his semantics, which relies on two distinct accessibility relations 
R and i? for interpreting negated formulae, is very different from ours, thus making 
difficult any comparison. 
A very interesting proposal has been presented by Fagin and Halpem in [ 331. In 
that paper they introduce a new propositional attitude, in addition to knowledge and 
belief: the attitude of awareness. This new modality should act as a kind of filter on the 
consequences that can be drawn. In their system, truth in a world is defined in terms of 
the relation bp, where q G L is a set of propositional letters and the agent is aware 
only of them. The intended meaning of b=’ is to restrict the attention only to letters in 
p, while letters in L \ P are ignored. Our notion of S-l-interpretation is exactly in the 
same spirit. However, in Fagin and Halpern’s system there is nothing close in spirit to 
the notion of S-3-interpretation. 
In a more recent work [ 341, Fagin, Halpern and Vardi present a different system 
which does not commit to the logical omniscience assumption. The presented system 
clarifies the reason why most of the non-classical semantics are not committed to 
logical omniscience. The main reasons are the impossibility of distinguishing either 
between coherent and incoherent worlds or between complete and incomplete ones. It 
is exactly the possibility of discerning between the various degrees of incoherence and 
incompleteness which has led us to the definition of our system. For example, the effect 
of the operator 0: is exactly to select only complete situations which can be only 
partially incoherent, i.e. can be incoherent only in the interpretation of the propositions 
in L \ S. Analogous is the effect of Cl! which selects only coherent situations being 
partially incomplete. 
All the results presented in this section will be proved in Appendix A.3. 
The results of this section have been published in a preliminary form in [ 121. 
7. Concept description languages 
In this section we generalize the technique introduced in Section 4 to deal with 
(fragments of) first-order logic. In particular, we take into account he so-called concept 
description Zogics, also known as terminological logics, that are abstractions for several 
languages in computer science and artificial intelligence. The importance of concept 
languages in data modeling [ 71, object-oriented atabases [ 31 and logic programming 
[ l] has been stressed by several authors. 
The computational complexity of concept languages has been extensively studied by 
many researchers (see [ 25,27,59,68] ) . In particular, it has been shown that reasoning 
is polynomially intractable in many interesting cases, and that tractability depends on 
small variations of the expressiveness of the language. A big effort has been spent in 
the design of “maximally polynomial anguages”, i.e. polynomial anguages uch that 
no expressiveness can be added without losing tractability. 
Other researchers (see [ 58,611) proposed incomplete or unsound reasoning systems 
based on non-standard semantics in order to simplify reasoning tasks for concept lan- 
guages. Patel-Schneider in [ 6 1 ] presented a polynomially tractable terminological logic 
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based on a 4-valued semantics. Kautz and Selman proposed in [69] a syntactical sim- 
plification of concepts in order to make inference computationally more tractable, by 
the definition of sound approximations and complete approximations. 
In this paper we focus our attention on the languages belonging to the AL-family 
(see [68] for an overview on the family) and in particular on ALE and ALC. As 
shown in [ 261, these languages are representative of a wide class of concept languages. 
The structure of this section is as follows: in the following subsection we recall the 
basic notions on concept languages, while in Section 7.2 we introduce multivalued logics 
for approximation in first-order languages. In Sections 7.3 and 7.4 we demonstrate our 
approximation method for the two languages ALE and ALC, respectively. 
7.1. Concept languages 
In this subsection we briefly summarize the syntax and semantics of concept descrip- 
tion languages. 
Concept languages are decidable sublanguages of predicate logic, designed for deal- 
ing with concepts. A concept is a monadic predicate that can be built up of two 
kinds of symbols, primitive concepts and roles. Primitive entities can be combined 
by various language constructors yielding complex concepts. A primitive concept is 
simply a symbol, like female, that is used to represent a class of individuals all hav- 
ing a common property, like being female. A primitive role is a symbol, like friend, 
that is used to represent a binary relation among individuals, like friendship. A typ- 
ical example of a language constructor is the universal quantification V. The symbol 
Vfriend.female is a composite concept that represents the set of individuals having all 
the friends being female. Other typical language constructors are the existential quantifi- 
cation 1 and the boolean connectives n, U, 1. Another example of composite concept 
is jfriend.Tfemale, that represents the set of individuals having at least one friend being 
not female. 
In this section we focus our attention on the two languages ALE and ALC belonging 
to the AL-family (see [ 681). 
Throughout this section we denote primitive concepts with the letters A and B, 
concepts (either primitive or composite) with the letters C and D and primitive roles 
with the letter R. 
The syntax of the language ACC is the following: 
c,D --+ TIIIAI~AI~~DICUDI~IR.CI~R.C 
The special symbols T and I stand for the universal concept and the empty concept, 
respectively. All the individuals belong to T, while no individual belongs to 1. Although 
the standard syntax of ACC allows negation in front of any concept, due to the presence 
of disjunction we don’t lose any generality by allowing negation only in front of primitive 
concepts. Examples of well-formed ALC concepts are: 
(3R.A) n (3R.(lAnVREIR.A)), 
ZlR.SlR.‘ifR.(AU B). 
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ALE is another interesting language, whose syntax is a restriction of that of MC. In 
particular the construct C U D is not allowed in AL&, therefore the first of the two ALC 
concepts above is also an AC& concept, while the second is not. 
The semantics of concept languages is usually given by defining a domain of inter- 
pretation U, by assigning to every primitive concept a subset of U and to every primitive 
role a subset of U x U and by defining a rule for each constructor. For the purpose of 
our work we prefer to define the semantics of ACE and dLC by translating any con- 
cept C into a first-order sentence T(C) and interpreting it with the classical semantics 
of first-order logic. As an example, the ALC concept D G (B n VR.A) U 3R.lB is 
translated into the first-order formula 
(B(a) AVxNa,x) -+ A(x)) v (3yR(u,y) A +(Y)), 
where a is a constant symbol. In general the translation from a concept C into the 
corresponding first-order formula is obtained by applying the following rewriting rules 
to c: 
T(C) t--+ NCU), 
@(T,x) H t, 
@(Lx) H f9 
@(A,x) H A(x), 
@( TA, x) I-+ PA, 
@(C n D,x) H @(C,x) A@(D,x), 
@(C u D,x) H @(C,x) V@(D,x), 
@(VR.C, x) ++ VyR(x, y) -+ @(C, y), 
@(3R.C,x) H 3yR(x,y) A@(C,Y), 
where u is a constant symbol, y is a variable symbol and x is either the constant 
symbol a or a variable symbol. We assume that the new variables introduced by the last 
two rules are fresh. A concept C is sutisjiubfe iff its translation T(C) is a satisfiable 
sentence, unsatisfiable otherwise. As an example, the concept VR.A is satisfiable, while 
the concept (VR.A) n3R.7A is unsatisfiable. It is immediate to show that this semantics 
is equivalent to the more standard semantics for concept languages as found, for example, 
in [68]. 
In this section we are interested in analyzing satisfiability problems, although the 
computational complexity of other reasoning tasks like subsumption and instance check- 
ing has been extensively studied in the literature. The complexity analysis has shown 
that satisfiability checking is PSPACE-complete for dLC [ 681 and co-NP-complete for 
ALE [25]. 
7.2. First-order generalization of S-interpretations 
In this subsection we define a generalized notion of interpretation of first-order for- 
mulae, in particular extending to a first-order semantics the definitions of S-3- and 
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S-l-interpretations introduced in Section 4. This new notion will be used in the fol- 
lowing for defining approximations methods for satisfiability of ACE and d,CC con- 
cepts. 
In order to simplify our definitions, we consider fixed domains of interpretation for 
the models. In particular we only consider Herbrand models. To this end, we assume 
that all sentences are in Skolem Normal Form. Since we are interested only in studying 
the satisfiability of sentences, the Herbrand theorem ensures that we are not losing any 
generality. 
We recall that the Herbrand Universe l/j, of a formula 4 is the set of terms that 
can be built using the constant and function symbols occurring in 4 (if no constants 
occur in 4 include one in rl;,). The Herbrand Base Bh of 4 is the set of ground atoms 
built applying predicate symbols occurring in e5 to terms of the Herbrand Universe. 
A Herbrand interpretation of the signature C used in 4 is a pair I = (I+, I-) of 
subsets of the Herbrand Base Bh which partition Bh. In other words I is built using two 
rules: 
Rule 1. It U I- = B,,. 
Rule 2. I+ n I- = 0. 
The subset I+ represents the set of atoms LY of Bh which are true in I, while I- 
represents the set of atoms (Y of BI, whose negation is true in I. Since there are only two 
possibilities for an atom, namely it may belong either to I+ or to I-, we are entitled 
to call the partition I a 2-interpretation of C. A %-interpretation I satisfies an atom 
LY (I + a) iff LY E If and satisfies a negated atom T(Y (I k T(Y) iff LX E I-. The 
satisfaction of complex sentences is defined using the standard rules for disjunction, 
conjunction and universal quantification: 
l V-rule: I k LY V/l iff I + LY or I + /3; 
l A-rule: I f= a A p iff I b LY and I k /?; 
0 V-rule: f + V’x.y(x) iff I + y(t) for all t E uh. 
We are not interested in rules for the interpretation of complex negated formulae, since 
it is always possible to “push” the negation in front of atoms using a variant of the 
rewriting rules presented in Section 4. 
The main idea of our semantic notion of approximation is to define interpretation of 
formulae without using one of Rules 1 or 2. This idea is a generalization of the idea 
presented in Section 4. In fact, loosely speaking, the Herbrand Base of a propositional 
formula is the set of the boolean variables occurring in it, therefore the Definition 2.1 
of 3-interpretation given by Levesque corresponds to keep Rule 1 but not Rule 2. 
We use the symbol C to denote a signature. We define a 3-interpretation of L to 
be a pair I = (If, I-) of subsets of Bh such that Rule 1 holds and Rule 2 may not 
hold. Interpretation of complex formulae is defined by means of the V-rule, A-rule and 
V-rule. 
The notions of satisfiability and entailment are defined as in the propositional case. 
Definition 4.1 of S-3-interpretation, presented in Section 4 makes use of Rule 2 in a 
restricted way. We now give the definition that applies to first-order formulae. Let S be 
a subset-even not proper-of the Herbrand Base Bh. 
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Definition 7.1 (S-3-interpretation of $rst-order formulae). An S-3-interpretation of .C 
is a pair I = (I+, I-) where both If and I- are subsets of Bh, such that 
Rule 1. I+ U I- = Bh. 
Rde2.ZfnZ-nS=Q). 
Intuitively, an S-3-interpretation is a 2-interpretation of the atoms of S, while it is a 
34nterpretation of the remaining atoms. The three possibilities for each atom LY of Bh 
are the following: 
(1) cu~Z+ anda$Z-; 
(2) (Y 61 If and (Y E I-; 
(3) (Y E If and a E I- [only if (Y E L \ S] . 
Notice that, for any S, a 2-interpretation is always an S-3-interpretation, while the 
latter is always a 3-interpretation. Satisfaction of complex sentences i defined by means 
of the V-rule, A-rule and V-rule. Notice also that if S E S’ C Bh, then S-3-unsatisfiability 
of a formula always implies its S’-3-unsatisfiability, hence its 2-unsatisfiability. 
Using this characteristic of S-3-satisfiability we can approximate the satisfiability 
problem for a formula by means of a sequence (So c SI c . . . c S,, = Bh) of sets. In 
the following we show actual examples of the choice of this kind of sequences in the 
context of the languages ALE and MC. 
We now introduce the definition of S-l-interpretation of first-order formulae, which 
is dual to S-3-interpretation and modifies Rule 1 while keeping Rule 2. 
Definition 7.2 (S-I-interpretation of jirst-order fomulae) . An S-l-interpretation of L 
is a pair Z = (I+, I-) where both I+ and I- are subsets of Bh, such that 
Rule l.Z+UZ-=S. 
RuIe2.Z+nZ-=@. 
An S-l-interpretation is a 2-interpretation as long as the atoms of S are concerned, 
while for all the atoms Q not in S it holds that (Y @’ I+ and (Y $ I-. 
We define Term(S) to be the set of all the terms that can be generated by using 
the functions and constants which appear in atoms of S. Notice that this is in general a 
subset of the Herbrand Universe. We define S-l-interpretation by means of the V-rule, 
A-rule and the following 
l V/-rule: Z b Vx.y(x) iff Z b y(t) for all t E Terms(S). 
As we show in the following subsections, we are not interested in sets S containing 
all the ground instances of a predicate symbol. S-l-interpretation with the V-rule would 
be trivial, since no sentence can be satisfied. The intuition behind the V/-rule is that we 
are ignoring objects that are not in the intended omain of interpretation. 
7.3. Approximation in ALE 
We now define a method for approximating the task of deciding satisfiability of 
an ALE concept. The method is based on a syntactic manipulation of concepts that 
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simplifies the task of checking their satisfiability. The syntactic manipulation is given a 
precise semantics in terms of S-l- and S-3-interpretations, 
The method we are going to present is based on the idea of approximating an ALE 
concept by means of two sequences of “simpler” ALE concepts. There are two ways 
in which a concept can be simpler than another one: a concept can be approximated 
either by a weaker concept or by a stronger one. A concept D is weaker than C if 
it represents a class with weaker properties, i.e. a less specific class. On the other 
hand, stronger concepts represent more specific classes. Both kinds of approximated 
concepts carry interesting information. In fact, if we can prove that a weaker concept is 
unsatisfiable, then the unsatisfiability of C is also proved. Proving the satisfiability of a 
stronger concept implies the satisfiability of C. One of the two sequences defining the 
approximation contains only weaker concepts. It starts with a very rough approximation 
and is improved in a stepwise process, giving “stronger and stronger” approximations 
and eventually converging to the original concept. The second sequence is dual, and 
contains only stronger concepts. 
As an example, let’s consider an unsatisfiable ALE concept, called dummy in the 
following 
(3friend.tall)fl 
Vfriend. ( (Vfriend.doctor) n 3friend.ldoctor). 
It denotes the (empty) set of the individuals having at least one friend tall and all the 
friends having both all the friends doctor and at least one friend who is not a doctor. 
For obtaining concepts approximating dummy we syntactically simplify it by sub- 
stituting complex subconcepts with simpler ones, where a subconcept D of an dL& 
concept C is a substring of C being an AL& concept. The depth of D is the number 
of universal quantifiers occurring in C and having D in their scope. For example, the 
depth of the subconcept 3friend.ydoctor of dummy is 1, while the depth of 3friend.taII 
is 0. We define the depth of a concept to be the maximum depth of its existentially 
quantified subconcepts. The depth of dummy is 1. 
Using the notion of depth we define the sequence of weaker approximated concepts. 
The ith weaker concept is obtained by replacing every existentially quantified subconcept 
of depth greater or equal than i with the primitive concept T. As an example, taking 
into account dummy we obtain the sequence of concepts: 
l T n Vfriend. ( (Vfriend.doctor) n T) . 
l (3friend.tall) fl Vfriend. ( (Vfriend.doctor) n T) . 
a dummy. 
The elements of the sequence are denoted as dummy:, dummyT and dummy:, re- 
spectively. Notice that the first two concepts are both satisfiable, while the third one 
is unsatisfiable. The sequence of the stronger concepts is obtained by substituting I 
instead of T. Its elements are denoted as dummy;, dummy: and dummy;, respectively. 
Formally, we associate to an ALE concept C of depth n two distinct sequences 
aT=CT n ,..., Cn’, andcrl=CO1,...,C,l+, of AL& concepts. For each i (0 < i < n), 
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every concept CiT [ Ci’ I of the sequence uT [al] is obtained from C by substituting 
every existentially quantified subconcept of C which is in the scope of at least i universal 
quantifiers with the concept T [I]. Moreover CT:+,, =C&t = C. Notice that, for each i 
(l<i<n+l) thedepthofc: [Ct] isstrictlylessthani. 
The semantics of the approximation will be addressed later on, but at this point we 
would like to make some intuitive considerations on the simplified concepts. As we 
noticed in Section 7.1, proving the satisfiability of a concept C is equivalent to proving 
the existence of an object a having the property represented by the first-order formula 
F(C) . If existentially quantified subconcepts of depth 0 occur in C, then it is necessary 
to consider objects related to a. As an example, when we deal with the concept dummy 
we need to consider the existence of a friend of a being tall, because of the subconcept 
3friend.tall of C. Let’s call c this friend. Deeper existentially quantified subconcepts 
may also contribute to the generation of objects that have to be considered. Continuing 
our example, the subconcept 3friend.Tdoctor of dummy makes it necessary to take into 
account he existence of a friend of c-let’s call it f(c) -not being a doctor. Intuitively, 
focusing on simplified concepts means ignoring the properties of objects which are “far 
away” from a. As an example, considering dummy: frees us from taking into account 
the object f(c), while when we consider dummy: we don’t even have to deal with 
the object c. This intuition will be clarified when we will analyze the semantics of the 
concepts in the approximating sequences. 
We now give a couple of important properties of the sequences uT and &, that are 
useful for defining our approximation schema. 
Theorem 7.3 (Monotonicity of aT and a’). For each i (0 < i < n + 1 ), if CT is 
unsatisfiable then Cj’ is unsatis$able for all j 2 i, hence C is unsatisfiable. 
For each i (0 < i < n + 1 ), if CiL is satisjiable then C,A is satisjiable for all j 2 i, 
hence C is satisjiable. 
Observation 7.4 (Convergence of aT and al). Zf C is unsatis$able, then there exists 
an i (0 < i < n + 1) such that CiT is unsatisjkzble. Zf C is satisfiable, then them exists 
an i (0 < i < n + 1) such that Ci’ is satisfiable. 
We notice that these results correspond to Theorem 4.4 and Observation 4.5 shown 
in Section 4. Theorem 7.3 and Observation 7.4 suggest a method for deciding in an 
incremental fashion the satisfiability of an AL& concept C. We may start by deciding 
the satisfiability of CT; if COT is unsatisfiable, then by Theorem 7.3 we are guaranteed 
that C is unsatisfiable as well. Analogously, if Ck is satisfiable, then we know that 
C is satisfiable. If neither of the two cases happens, then we decide the satisfiability 
of C,T and C,l, and so on. Clearly we have a definite answer as soon as we prove 
either unsatisfiability of some CtT or satisfiability of some Ci*. Referring to the notation 
defined in Section 3, we approximate the set D of satisfiable AC& concepts of depth n 
bymeansoftwosequencesofsets (Da,~t,...,2)n+t) and (@r,D’,...,2Y+1),where 
‘.Di [D’] is the set of ALE concepts C whose stronger [weaker] form Ci’ [CfT] is 
satisfiable. 
We now make some considerations on the computational cost of deciding satisfiability 
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of an AL& concept in such an incremental fashion. Donini et al. show in [25] that 
the problem of checking the satisfiability of an ALE concept whose depth is linear in 
its length is co-NP-complete. In the same paper it is shown that the satisfiability of 
any d,CCE concept having depth m can be checked in time proportional to 1. 2m, where 
1 is the length of the concept. In other words, the nesting of existential and universal 
quantifiers is the crucial measure of the complexity of satisfiability checking. If such a 
nesting is bounded by a constant, then satisfiability can be tested in linear time. This 
observation has the same importance of Theorem 4.6 presented in Section 4. 
Our method for checking satisfiability of an ALE concept C considers simplified 
versions of C of increasing depth and may use existing algorithms for checking their 
satisfiability. The complexity of the whole method is O(Z2 . 2m) even if satisfiability 
cannot be decided until the unsimplified concept C is taken into account. In the worst 
case the complexity of our method is therefore comparable to that of the existing 
algorithms. Since the problem is co-NP-complete, we don’t expect any algorithm to be 
significantly better than ours in the worst case. 
We are now interested in giving a clear semantics to our approximation schema. This is 
particularly important, since as we stressed earlier it is not always possible to obtain in a 
reasonable amount of time a definite answer to the problem of checking the satisfiability 
of an AL& concept. Therefore the meaning of each step of the approximation should 
be very clear, since in general we can afford only an approximate solution. 
In order to give a semantic account to the approximations of ALE concepts, we are 
now going to use the notions of S-3- and S-l-interpretation introduced in Section 7.2 
As we noticed earlier, S-3-interpretations lead to a complete (and in general unsound) 
definition of satisfiability. Analogously, Theorem 7.3 shows that satisfiability of the 
concepts of the sequence aT is complete and unsound with respect to the satisfiability of 
the original concept C. Our goal is to show that 2-satisfiability (or simply, satisfiability) 
of each concept CjT is equivalent to Si-3-satisfiability of C for a suitable subset Si of 
the Herbrand Base of the Skolem Normal Form SNF(T(C)) of T(C). An analogous 
result will be obtained for a concept CiL and Si-1-satisfiability of C. 
As we said in Section 7.1, the semantics of an ALE concept C can be defined 
in terms of a first-order formula r(C). Since we are only interested in satisfiability 
properties, we take into account the Skolem Normal Form SNF( r( C) ) of r(C) . The 
Herbrand Universe of SNF( T(C)) can be stratified in a very simple way by taking 
into account the increasing complexity of its terms. This stratification delivers another 
simple stratification on the Herbrand Base. More precisely, let uh be the Herbrand 
Universe of SNF( T(C)). This universe can be stratified with the following policy: Let 
Ue be {u} and Ui be the set of all the terms which can be formed using a, Skolem 
constants of uh and functions of uh of arity strictly less than i. Clearly it holds that 
ua c ui E ... c u,,, = uh. Notice that a function of arity i comes from the 
skolemization of an existential quantifier of depth i. This stratification of the Herbrand 
Universe of SNF( r( C) ) induces a stratification 50 C Si C . . . c &+I = Bj, on its 
Herbrand Base Bh defined in the following way: 
Si = {A(t) 1 A is a primitive concept and t E C/i} 
U{R(tl,tz) 1 R is a role and ti,t2 E Ui}. 
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A clarifying example is in order. Let’s consider again the concept dummy 
(3friend.tall)f-l 
Vfriend.( (Vfriend.doctor) n 3friend.ldoctor) 
and the related first-order formula r(dummy), in which we use obvious abbreviations 
for the predicate symbols 
(3XF(Q,X) AT(x)) AVY F(a,y) + 
WZ(WY,Z) -D(z)) A(3uWy,u) A+(u))). 
The following formula is the Skolem Normal Form SNF( r(dummy) ) of I’(dummy) 
F(a,c) A T(c) A Vy(F(a,y) -+ 
W(F(y,z) -D(z))AF(y,f(y))A~D(f(y)))). 
In SNF( r(dummy) ), c is a new constant symbol that replaces the variable x, while 
f( ) is a new function symbol-having arity l-replacing the variable u. The Herbrand 
Universe Uh of SNF( r(dummy) ) is the set of all the terms that can be obtained from 
a, c and f(). The Universe uh is stratified into the three sets Vc = {a}, Ui = {u, c} 
and U2 ={a,c,f(a),f(c>,f(f(~)),...}. 
Notice that Si turns out to be equal (up to Skolem functions and constants renaming) 
to the Herbrand Base of SNF(r(CiT)). 
As we saw before the concept dummy is unsatisfiable. We noticed informally that its 
unsatisfiability can only be proven by taking into account he properties of the friends 
of the friends of a: All the members of this class should be doctors, while one of them 
is not a doctor. As a consequence, dummy is unsatisfiable, but its simplified versions 
dummy~ and dummy: are both satisfiable. As a semantic ounterpart, we notice that 
SNF( r( dummy) ) is unsatisfiable and this follows from the existence of a term of the 
form f(c) which denotes the friend of the friend c of a. Actually SNF( r(dummy) ) is 
both SO-~- and Si-3-satisfiable, where a concept C is Si-3-satisfiable if SNF(T(C)) is 
93-satisfiable with S = Si. This can be easily shown by noticing that the atom D(f(c)) 
does not belong to Si, hence it is possible to define an St-3-interpretation I = (I+, I-) 
such that D( f( c) ) E I+ and D( f(c)) E I-. This kind of interpretation “hides” the 
reason of inconsistency of the concept dummy, which is therefore Si-3-satisfiable. This 
argument obviously holds also for the stratum &. 
The above example shows that it is possible to relate Si-3-satisfiability of a concept 
C of AL& to satisfiability of the ith element CT of the sequence uT. The following 
theorem formalizes this result. 
Theorem 7.5 (Semantics of aT). For all i (0 < i < n + l), C is Si-3-satisfiable iff 
Ci’ is sutisjkble. 
What this theorem says is that our approximation schema based on the analysis of 
syntactically simplified concepts readily corresponds to the semantic idea of focusing on 
subsets of the Herbrand Base which are defined by a simpler universe. This characteri- 
zation of the approximation process could not be obtained if we were to use the more 
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standard semantics for AL-languages (see Appendix A.4) based on extension functions, 
since we could not introduce the notion of complexity of terms. 
The above correspondence between Si-3-satisfiability of a concept C of AL& and 
satisfiability of the ith element CT of the sequence gT can be easily extended to the 
dual case of Si-1-satisfiability. Similarly to the previous case, it is possible to show that 
the approximation of the satisfiability of a concept C through the sequence & can 
be interpreted as Si-1-satisfiability of the translated concept SNF( T(C)). This follows 
from the equivalence of the Herbrand Base of SNF(T(Ci’)) and the Herbrand Base of 
SNF(T(C,T)). 
Theorem 7.6 (Semantics of (TV). For all i (0 < i 6 n + I), C is $-l-satisfiable ifs 
CiL is satisfiable. 
Notice that the difference between Si-l- and Si-3-interpretations relies on the in- 
terpretation of atoms not belonging to the stratum Si. As an example, in each St-l- 
interpretation I of the concept dummy it holds that D( f( c) ) $Z If and D ( f( c) ) 6 I-. 
We conclude this section by making some considerations about the choice of the 
subsets Si of the Herbrand Base of SNF(T(CiT)) defining our approximation schema. 
Donini et al. show in [25] that the number of primitive concepts and roles used is not 
a source of complexity in ALE. More precisely, deciding the satisfiability of an AC& 
concept C is a co-NP-complete problem even if a single primitive role and no primitive 
concepts but T occur in C. 
This fact has an important impact in the choice of an approximation schema for ALE 
concepts. In particular it shows that, if the subset S of the Herbrand Base contains 
all the ground instances of a single atomic role, then deciding S-3-satisfiability of an 
ACE concept is still co-NP-complete. Therefore the sets S defining the approximation 
schema must be designed so that the real source of complexity-which is the depth of 
concepts-is addressed. 
7.4. Approximation in ALC 
In this subsection we define a method for approximating the task of deciding satisfi- 
ability of an ALC concept. Like the method illustrated in the previous subsection, also 
this one is based on a syntactic manipulation of concepts that is interpreted in terms of 
S- I- and 93-satisfiability. 
A first obvious question is: can we plainly use the method introduced in Section 
7.3 for the purpose of approximating ALC concepts? We notice that ALC without 
existential quantifiers has at least the expressiveness of propositional calculus. As a 
consequence deciding satisfiability of ALC concepts without existential quantifiers is 
an NP-hard problem. This implies that the method defined for the approximation of 
an ALE concept leads-when used for ACC concepts-to polynomially intractable 
problems from the very first step of the approximation. In our opinion an effective 
method for the approximation of ACC should address both sources of complexity of 
this language (see [ 261) : the complexity of existentials, also present in ACE, and that 
of disjunction, present in the existential-free fragment of ALC. 
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The source of complexity of disjunction is also present in the propositional calculus. 
The method presented in Section 4 for approximating propositional satisfiability relies 
on the use of S-l- and S-3-satisfiability, in which sets S containing more and more 
boolean variables are taken into account. This corresponds to a stratification So C St C 
. * * c %,I = Bh of the Herbrand Base Bh, in which each stratum contains all the ground 
instances of a predicate symbol. As we noticed at the end of tbe previous section, such 
a stratification cannot be used for the approximation of ACE, which must instead be 
based on the complexity of the terms of the Herbrand Universe. It is therefore natural 
to combine both ideas for the approximation of ALC. In the method we are going 
to present, the concepts of the approximating sequences have both a fixed depth and 
interpret classically only a subset of the primitive concepts. 
Let’s start again with a concrete example and consider the following ALC concept: 
D z (A n -A) U ((VR.A) fl3R.lA). 
D is unsatisfiable, because it is the union of two unsatisfiable ~J!X concepts. D can be 
approximated either by substituting the existentially quantified subconcept 3R.lA with 
T or by replacing the primitive concept A and its negation TA with T. Moreover both 
methods can be combined. Each of the following dLC concepts is weaker than D and 
satisfiable: 
T_ D,,, = (T n T) u (VR.T n T). 
D&).0 = ( A n 1A) L. (VR.A n T). 
D& E (T n T) u (VR.T n 3R.T). 
The first subscript denotes the set of primitive concepts that are not substituted by T, 
while the second one denotes the depth of the approximation. In general, given an ALC 
concept C of depth n built on the set A of primitive concepts, a set P G A and an 
index 0 < i < it + 1, we denote with the symbol C~i the dLC concept obtained from 
C by means of the following rules: 
( 1) Substitute ach (positive or negative) occurrence of a primitive concept not in 
P with the concept T, thus obtaining the concept C’. 
(2) Substitute very existentially quantified subconcept of C’ which is in the scope 
of at least i universal quantifiers with the concept T. 
The concept C~i is obtained by substituting I instead of T. Let PI and P2 be two 
subsets of A and let it and iz be two indexes such that 0 < il, i2 < n + 1. Let C be 
an ACC concept and let Cl = C&, and C2 G Ci,iz be two approximations of C. We 
say that C1 5 C2 holds iff both PI G P2 and il Q i2 hold. We define the relation 5 
only between pairs of weaker approximations and pairs of stronger ones. This relation 
is a partial order in the set of the approximations of an ALC concept. The following 
are two interesting properties of this relation: 
Theorem 7.7 (Monotonicity). Let P be a subset of A and i be an index such that 
0 6 i < n + 1. Zf C& is unsatisjiable, then any subconcept D of C such that Czi 5 D 
is unsatis$able. If C~i is satisjiable, then any subconcept D of C such that Ckj 5 D is 
satisjable. 
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Observation 7.8 (Convergence). If C is unsatis$able, then there exists a subset P of 
A and an index i (0 < i < n + 1) such that CL. is unsatisfiable. If C is satisfiable, then 
there exists a subset P of A and an index i (0 < i 6 n + 1) such that C$. is satisfiable. 
The above properties are analogous to Theorem 7.3 and Observation 7.4 for ALE. 
Along the same lines of Section 7.3, we say that any ALC concept C can be approx- 
imated by means of an increasing (with respect to 3) sequence of weaker concepts 
CL.. This corresponds to a weak approximation of C. A strong approximation can be 
obtained by considering an increasing sequence of concepts Cki. 
It can be shown that satisfiability checking of a subconcept CA or C&. can be done 
in time proportional to 21pl’i. This property entitles us to perform an argument similar 
to that of Section 7.3, in order to show that our method for checking satisfiability of 
ALC concepts in an incremental fashion has a complexity comparable to the standard 
algorithms (see [ 681). 
From the semantical point of view it is possible to characterize this form of approxi- 
mation in terms of S-3- and S-l-interpretations. Let C be an ALC concept and n be its 
depth-defined exactly as in the case of ALE concepts. The stratification Uu c Ut C 
... c Un+l = Uh of the Herbrand Universe ZJh of SNF( r( C)) is defined as in the 
previous section. We define the subset SP,~ of the Herbrand Base Bh of SiVP’(T(C)) to 
be the following set: 
{A(t) / A is a primitive concept in P and t E Ui} 
U {R( tl, tz) 1 R is a role and tl, t2 E Ui}. 
We say that C is Sei-3-satisfiable iff it is S-3-satisfiable for S = SP,~. The intuition 
behind this definition is that we are confining our attention only to a subset of the set 
S; defined in Section 7.3. In particular we want a unary atom A(t) to be in S,i only if 
the concept A belongs to the set of privileged primitive concepts P. In this way we are 
limiting both sources of potential complexity: disjunction and existential quantification. 
Contradiction cannot arise from roles, since d&C does not support negation on roles. In 
an analogous way we define SRI-l-satisfiability. The following properties formalize the 
relations between syntax and semantics: 
Theorem 7.9 (Semantics of T rewriting). For all i (0 < i < n + 1) and P C A the 
concept C is Sp,i-3-satisfiable ifs Cgj is satisfiable. 
Theorem 7.10 (Semantics of i rewriting). For all i (0 < i < n + 1) and P & A the 
concept C is SRI- 1 -satisfiable iff C& is satisjable. 
We conclude this section by noticing that the method we propose for the approximation 
of ALC concepts is in some sense underspecified, since we gave no criteria for choosing 
subsets P of the set of primitive concepts. In particular, it makes sense to ask whether 
it is more appropriate to enlarge the set P or to increase the index i when deciding 
satisfiability of a given concept. We remind that for each A E P and each term t E Vi 
we know exactly whether t satisfies the property A or not. 
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In Section 7.3 we noticed that increasing the index i corresponds to admit terms of the 
interpretation that are more and more complex, i.e. to have a wider Herbrand Universe. 
On the other hand enlarging the set P amounts to interpret classically a wider set of 
concepts, but we don’t have to consider new terms, i.e. the Herbrand Universe remains 
the same. Therefore if we want a sound and complete treatment of a large collection of 
individuals, but we are not committed to assign them many properties, then we should 
increase the index i. If we want a sound and complete treatment of a large collection of 
properties, but we are not committed to consider all the potential individuals, then we 
should enlarge the set P. 
All the results presented in this section will be proved in Appendix A.4. 
The results of this section have been published in a preliminary form in [ 131. 
8. Propositional modal logics 
In this section we present he use of our approximation methods in the field of modal 
logics. In particular we show how it is possible to approximate satisfiability in the most 
widely used modal logics for knowledge and belief, namely S5, K, 7 and S4. This 
is the second section devoted to modal logics. In Section 6 we focused on the use of 
a multimodal anguage as a tool for modeling approximate knowledge of a resource- 
bounded agent. The goal of this section is to approximate reasoning in classical modal 
logics. 
A detailed analysis of the computational complexity of satisfiability problems in 
several propositional modal systems has been done by Ladner [ 521. He showed that the 
problem of checking satisfiability of a formula in the systems K, 7 and S4 is PSPACE- 
complete, while the same problem is NP-complete in the system S5. Therefore most of 
the modal logics frequently used for modeling knowledge and belief (see [ 431) lead to 
computationally intractable reasoning problems. 
In this section we focus on the problem of applying approximation techniques to 
such propositional modal systems. The main idea is to extend the method defined for 
propositional logic by defining two classes of interpretations which are approximations 
of the standard Kripke semantics. 
In the following we refer to modal formulae which are built on the set L* by means 
of the usual connectives V and A, the modal operator K, the negation -IK of the 
modal operator, plus parentheses. Using the terminology introduced in Section 6, we 
call formulae of this kind modal negation ormal form (MNNP) formulae. Let LY be a 
formula in which each occurrence of a modal operator lies in the scope of at most II 
modal operators. The parameter n is called the modal depth of cy. 
We remind the definition of a Kripke model. 
Definition 8.1 (Ktipke [ 5 1 ] ) . A Kripke model is a triple M = (W, R, V) where W is a 
set of worlds, R an accessibility relation among worlds and V a mapping W + 7, where 
T is the set of all the truth assignments of L*. 
In a standard Kripke model V(w) is a 2-interpretation for every world w E W. We 
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refer to standard Kripke models as 2-Kripke interpretations. In this section we want to 
consider also other forms of interpretations, defined as follows. 
Definition 8.2 (S- 1 -Kripke interpretation). An S-l-Kripke interpretation is a Kripke 
model such that V(w) is an S-l-interpretation for every world w E W (cf. Defini- 
tion 4.3). 
Definition 8.3 (S-3-Kripke interpretation). An S-3-Kripke interpretation is a Kripke 
model such that V(w) is an S-3-interpretation for every world w E W (cf. Defini- 
tion 4.1). 
The evaluation of a propositional formula y in any world w E W of an S-l-Kripke 
interpretation M = (W, R, V) is defined as in Section 6; in particular we write M, w /=l 
y iff V(w) (y) = 1, that is V(w) maps y into 1. The value assigned by M to a MNNF 
formula (Y in a world w E W is defined by using the rule for propositional formulae and 
recursively the following rules: 
l M, w bl KP iff Vt E W wRt implies M, t bk /I; 
l M,w~~~KPiffEItEWwRtandM,t+~~p. 
Notice that /3 may not be in MNNF, in this case we need to transform it in its MNNF 
equivalent. A modal formula (Y is S-l-Kripke satisjiable iff there exists an S-1-Kripke 
interpretation M = (W R, V) and a w E W s.t. M, w bi CL 
The definitions of S-3-Kripke interpretation and S-3-Kripke satisfiability are straight- 
forward. We refer to standard satisfiability of a modal formula as 2-Kripke satisJubility. 
Some remarks are in order here to make clear the differences and the analogies with 
the system introduced in Section 6. Notice, first of all, that the language introduced 
in Section 6 is an extension of the classical modal language with one modal operator, 
in fact we have two families of modal operators, i.e. 0: and q L, which are used as 
meta-descriptors of the entailment relations /=i and bi. Here, on the other hand, we 
are dealing with a simple modal language. Furthermore, here our main concern is the 
computational behavior of the problems of satisfiability testing, while in Section 6 we 
were mainly interested in the expressiveness of the language as a representational tool 
for approximate inference. 
This difference in the emphasis leads to two different semantic definitions for negation 
in front of modal operators. To be more concrete, let a be a propositional formula, it 
is always the case that Cl& A 10; CY is unsatisfiable while Ka A 7Ka is S-3-Kripke 
satisfiable whenever LX A T(Y is S-3-satisfiable. This is an immediate consequence of the 
two different definitions for negation in fact here M, w /=i -KP holds iff we can find 
a world connected to w which makes p false, while M, w k 10; LY holds iff we can 
find an S-3-situation connected to w which does not make LY true, i.e. M, w 1 q $r. 
We want to point out that, if we were to choose the second definition for S-3-Kripke 
satisfiability then the results proven in the sequel on uniform complexity would no longer 
hold. On the other side, if we were to define satisfiability of negated modal formulae 
in Section 6 using the rule used here, the resulting language would not be expressive 
enough to be able to represent the approximate entailment relations. 
We now demonstrate our definitions by means of two examples. 
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Example 8.4 (Proving S-3-Kripke unsatisfiability). We show an alphabet L, a modal 
formula (+ on L and a subset S of L such that CT is S-3-Kripke unsatisfiable. 
Let L be {a, b, c}, S be {a, b} and u be (Ka A K( ya V b) A Klb A ~Kc). Let 
us assume that u is S-3-Kripke satisfiable. By the above definition this implies that 
there exists an S-3-Kripke-interpretation M = (u! R, V) and a w E W such that all the 
following conditions hold: 
l M,w+iKa; 
l M,w ki K(TaVb); 
l M,w +-‘, Klb; 
l M,w k”, -Kc. 
The above conditions are equivalent to the following ones: 
l ‘dt E W wRt implies M, t ki a; 
l Q’tE WwRtimpliesM,t bi(~aVb); 
l Vt E W wRt implies M, t ki Tb; 
l %WwRtandM,t+. 
Let to be the world whose existence is implied by the last condition, that is let to E W, 
wRto and V( to) ( TC) = 1. According to the other conditions, the truth assignment V( to) 
must satisfy the propositional formula (a A (-a V b) A lb). Taking into account hat 
V( to) is an S-3-interpretation of L* and that S = {a, b}, V(to) satisfies (a A Tb) if 
and only if it maps a into 1, la into 0, b into 0 and Tb into 1. Therefore V( to) maps 
(la v 6) into 0, hence it does not satisfy (a A ( Ta V b) A yb) . This contradiction proves 
that u is S-3-Kripke unsatisfiable. 
Notice that a is S’-3Xripke satisfiable, where S’ = {a}. 
Example 8.5 (Proving S-l-Kripke satisjiability). We show an alphabet L, a modal for- 
mula 7 on L and a subset S of L such that 7 is S-l-Kripke satisfiable. 
Let L be {a, b}, S be {b} and 7 be (lb A Ka A K( la V b) > . By the above definition, 
7 is S-1-Kripke satisfiable if and only if there exists an S-1-Kripke-interpretation M = 
(W R, V) and a w E W such that all the following conditions hold: 
. M,w &b; 
l ‘v”t E W wRt implies M, t ki a; 
l ‘v”tEWwRtimpliesM,t+~(~aVb). 
Let W be the singleton {w}, R be the empty set and the S-l-interpretation V(w) of L* 
be such that V(w) (a) = V(w)(ya) = V(w)(b) = 0 and V(w)(lb) = 1. It is easy to 
see that M, w +i 7 holds, where M = (W, R, V). Therefore 7 is S-l-Kripke satisfiable. 
We now show two straightforward consequences of the definitions of S-l and S-3- 
Kripke satisfiability (a is a MNNF formula). 
Theorem 8.6 (Monotonicity) . For any S and S’ such that S c S’ C L, if (Y is S-l- 
Kripke satisjiable, then LY is S’-l-Kripke satis$able (hence 2-Kripke satisjiable). More- 
over if (Y is S-3-Kripke unsatis$able, then cr is S’-3-Kripke unsarisjable (hence 2-Kripke 
unsatisjiable) . 
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Observation 8.7 (Convergence). If a is 2-Kripke satisfiable, then there exists an S C L 
such that a is S- 1 -Kripke satisfiable. If a is 2-Kripke unsatisfiable, then there exists an 
S 2 L such that LY is S-3-Kripke unsatisfiable. 
The above properties account for a stepwise procedure for deciding 2-Kripke satisfia- 
bility of a modal formula, which is analogous to that defined in Section 4 for checking 
2-satisfiability of a propositional formula. As a consequence of Theorem 8.6 we have 
that the formula IY of Example 8.4 is 2-Kripke unsatisfiable and the formula r of Ex- 
ample 8.5 is 2-Kripke satisfiable. The following theorem shows that there exist modal 
systems, e.g. S5, in which such a stepwise procedure is interesting from a computational 
point of view. 
Theorem 8.8 (Uniform complexity for S5). If we restrict our attention to accessibility 
relations which are re$exive, transitive and euclidean, then there exists one algorithm to 
decide if a is S- 1 -Kripke satisfiable and one to decide if LY is S-3-Kripke satisfiable both 
running in 0( m . ICYI 21’1) time, where m is the number of occurrences of the modal 
operator in ff. 
The above theorem shows that all the considerations made in Section 6 on the approx- 
imation of the 2-satisfiability of a propositional formula also hold for the approximation 
of the 2-Kripke satisfiability of any formula of the modal system S5. 
The same idea can be applied, with only minor variations, to other systems whose 
satisfiability check is known to be an NP-complete problem, such as X45 and X34.5. 
This holds since in these systems any satisfiable formula is satisfied by a 2-Kripke 
interpretation whose set of worlds W has size bounded by a polynomial function of the 
size of the formula itself. 
On the other hand, as proved by the following result, there exist interesting modal 
systems, such as K, in which the stepwise procedure suggested by Theorem 8.6 and 
Observation 8.7 is not useful from a computational point of view. 
Theorem 8.9 (Non-uniform complexity for K) . If the accessibility relation is unre- 
stricted, then deciding if a is S- I-Kripke satisfiable and deciding if a is S-3-Kripke 
satisfiable are PSPACE-complete problems even if ISI = 1. 
This result prevents us from the development of a result analogous to Theorem 8.8 
for unrestricted accessibility relation (unless P=PSPACE). This is not surprising, since 
Ladner has shown [52] that there exist formulae in the systems K, 7 and S4, which 
are satisfied only by 2-Kripke interpretations having a set of worlds whose size is 
exponential in the nesting of the modal operators. 
A possible way to overcome this problem is to focus only on limited parts of the 
interpretations. We now present a semantics for approximation which further extends 
the possible-worlds semantics. The idea is that a Kripke interpretation M should satisfy 
a formula LY in a world w iff LY is satisfied in the subset W’ C W of the possible worlds 
containing only those worlds whose distance from w is less than or equal to i, where i 
is a particular integer. In this way we can limit our attention to Kripke interpretations 
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having O(2’) worlds. The worlds which are outside the “range” i are treated ifferently 
in the s-l- and in the S-3-case. In particular s-l-Kripke interpretations are “pessimistic”, 
since they do not validate anything in those worlds, while S-3-Kripke interpretations are 
“optimistic”, since they validate everything. 
Let (Y be a modal formula, n its modal depth, S a subset of L, i Q n + 1, and 
M = (w R, V) an S-3-Kripke interpretation. We define a new relation bi,i as follows 
( y is a propositional formula) :
l M,w+i,iyifandonlyif(V(w)(y)=lori<O); 
l M,w~~,ia.ApifandonlyifM,w~~,iaandM,w~:iP; 
l M,~+~,~aVpifandonlyifM,w~~,~cyorM,w~~~/3; 
l M, w +i,i Ka if and only if Vf E W wRt implies M, t ps,i_, a; 
l M, w +i,i 7Ka if and only if 3t E W wRt and M, t bi,i_, TX. 
Notice that according to the above definition, if i < 0 then any formula is true in 
any world. A modal formula LY is (s,i)-3-Kripke satisfiable iff there exists an S-3- 
interpretation M = (u! R, V) and a w E W s.t. M, w k$ a. 
A similar definition can be given for the relation ki,i. The only difference is that now 
M is an S-1-Kripke interpretation and the definition of the base case is: 
l M,w +i,i y if and only if (V(w)(y) = 1 and i > 0). 
Notice that if i < 0 then a formula cannot be true in a world. It is easy to show that 
the analogue of Theorem 8.6 holds for the new definitions, when we compare pairs 
(S, i) and (9, j) such that S G S’ C L and i < j < n + 1. In other words if a modal 
formula LY is (S,i)-3-Kripke unsatisfiable, then it is (S’,j)-3-Kripke unsatisfiable, and 
if it is (S,i)-l-Kripke satisfiable, then it is (S’,j)-1-Kripke satisfiable. Moreover, there 
exists a subset S of L and an integer i < n + 1 such that (Y is either (S, i)-l-satisfiable 
or (S, i)-3-unsatisfiable. 
We can also prove that there exists an algorithm for deciding if a modal formula LY is 
(,S, i)-3-Kripke satisfiable which runs in 0( 1~~1. 2 sl.i) time, provided that the constraints 
of either K: or 7 or S4 hold on the accessibility relation. The algorithm for determining 
(S, i)-3-Kripke satisfiability of a modal formula (r is based on a mapping of cr into 
another modal formula I& (LX), in which the nesting of the modal operators is limited 
and any occurrence of a letter not in S is substituted by the literal t. More precisely, if 
i < 0 then I,& (cu) is t, otherwise ~~,i ( (Y) is obtained by: 
( 1) substituting each occurrence of a letter in L \ S with the literal t, thus obtaining 
the formula a’; 
(2) substituting every subformula TKP of (Y’ which is in the scope of at least i 
modal operators K with the literal t. 
The relation between LY and t&(a) is the following: 
Theorem 8.10 (Semantics of rewriting). Let a be a modal formula and X be a modal 
system admitting the K schema and the rule of necessitation. 7’he formula LY is (S, i)- 
3-Kripke satis$able in the system X iff I&((Y) is 2-Kripke satisjiable in the system 
X. 
292 M. Schaet$ hf. Cudoli/Ari$citrl Intelligence 74 (1995) 249-310 
Since the 2-Kripke satisfiability of I& (a) can be determined with standard algorithms 
-which run in time 0( ICX . 21sl.i)-we have an effective procedure to decide (S,i)-3- 
Kripke satisfiability. The algorithm for checking (S, i)-1-Kripke satisfiability is based on 
a similar mapping $& in which the literal f is used instead of using t. 
Theorem 8.10 allows us to extend all the considerations on the approximation of 
the 2-satisfiability of a propositional formula to the approximation of the 2-Kripke 
satisfiability of any formula of the modal systems PC, 7 and S4. 
As for the strategy for approximating satisfiability of a formula in the modal systems 
K, 7 or S4, we have to choose whether to increase the index i or to enlarge the set 
S. Given that the index i captures the complexity of the frame, while the set S captures 
the accuracy of each world within the frame, the discussion presented at the end of 
Section 7.4 applies to this case as well. 
All the results presented in this section will be proved in Appendix A.5. 
The results of this section have been published in a preliminary form in [ 121. 
9. Conclusions, open problems and future research 
Approximation techniques are widely used in many areas of computer science to 
deal with polynomially intractable problems. In this paper we dealt with approximations 
in the non-numerical problems of inference and satisfiability checking in a number of 
logical systems. 
We started by analyzing two techniques for approximate reasoning that have been 
defined in the literature by other authors. By comparing the fundamental aspects of 
these two techniques we were able to give a list of desiderata for a new approximation 
method. The most important aspects of the new method are: semantical description 
and efficient computation of approximate answers, possibility of having more and more 
precise answers, unique approach for a variety of deduction problems. 
The new technique has been introduced in the framework of propositional logic, and 
has been successively extended to inference and satisfiability checking in other logical 
systems, including fragments of first-order logic and modal logic. Moreover we intro- 
duced an epistemic language for the representation of approximate knowledge, owned 
by an agent with limited computational resources. Further results on the applicability of 
our approximation schema to reasoning problems of default logic and circumscription, 
two of the best-known formalism for nonmonotonic reasoning, have been presented in 
]141. 
These results complement the more classical approach to tractability, that is language 
restriction. In particular approximation techniques can be very useful whenever the 
expressiveness of polynomial languages is severely limited. 
In our research we stressed the point of providing the approximate answer with a 
clear semantics. Other authors (for example [ 32,381) are more interested in preserving 
the plausibility of the mechanism as a model of human reasoning. We believe that a 
parameter specifying “how much” the user can trust an approximate answer would be 
very interesting from the practical point of view. In our research we pursued symbolic 
approaches and we tried to specify such a degree of belief by means of an epistemic 
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logic for non-omniscient agents (cf. Section 6). Anyway we don’t disregard in principle 
methods based on numerical approaches. 
There are a number of possible directions in which our research on approximate 
reasoning can be continued. We close our work by giving a list of topics that we 
consider particularly interesting for future research: 
Logical aspects 
l We would like to provide S-l- and S-3-entailment with a proof theory, for example 
with a Gentzen-style system. 
l We would like to give a sort of “interpolation theorem” for S-3- and S-l-entailment 
(cf. [ 50, Section 561) In such a way we expect o have a formalization of the gain 
of information that we have in the stepwise solution of the problem. 
Computational aspects 
l It would be interesting to study the computational complexity of optimization 
problems like: 
- Given a pair of propositional formulae T and y, find the size ISI of a minimal 
set S such that either T bi y or T Fi y holds. Find one such set S of minimal 
size. 
- Given a pair of propositional formulae T and y and the fact that both T pi y and 
T b: y for a fixed set of letters S $0, find the size 1 S’I of a minimal set S’ > S 
such that either T k’,, y or T &, y holds. Find one such set S’ of minimal size. 
Integration with other approximation techniques 
l We have briefly mentioned in Section 4 that our method has some similarities 
with the techniques used in the field of abstract interpretation. Our approach is 
more semantics-oriented, while abstract interpretation uses algebraic and syntactic 
methods. We believe that a more careful comparison of the relative advantages of
the two methods can lead to further results. 
l We think that the idea of knowledge compilation (see [47,49,69] and Section 2) 
is particularly interesting, as this is a task that can be done off-line. We plan to 
investigate about the possibility to integrate knowledge compilation and on-line 
approximate reasoning. 
l Is there any relation between our definition of approximation and a definition of 
approximation based on numerical estimates? As an example, we know that T k y 
iff M(T) G M(y), where M( ) denotes the models of a propositional formula. 
Let us define a new form of approximate entailment as follows: consider the number 
Sdefinedastheratio(]M(T)]-]M(y)])/]M(T)].ClearlyO<6< 1andTby 
iff S = 0. Intuitively we can say that an estimate of S gives an estimate of the 
validity of the relation T b y; in particular if we suspect hat S is low, then we 
might be willing to accept hat T + y holds. 
Is there any relation between 6 and S-3-, S-l-entailment? Notice that if we can 
relate a numerical parameter of this kind with the approximate inference, then we 
might have a heuristic “measure” of the reliability of intermediate answers. 
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Use of meta-knowledge 
l In Section 6 we have presented some ideas on how an expressive language can be 
used to declaratively state properties of a knowledge base and help in the query 
answering process. In our opinion, this is a very important issue and we believe 
that it deserves further theoretical investigation as well as experiments in applicative 
domains. Moreover the computational complexity of such a modal language has to 
be investigated. 
l Extend the epistemic language for non-omniscient agents to a multi-agent frame- 
work. Such an extended language would be able to formalize the interaction between 
several non-omniscient agents. 
Approximation of other computational tasks 
l Extend the work on approximation to planning problems (which are in general 
search problems). In this field, there is a need for efficient inference mechanisms 
to be used in real-time systems. In the literature some interesting work on approx- 
imation of planning has already been done (see for example literature on any-time 
algorithms [ 23,39,65] ) . We believe that our framework can be successfully applied 
to planning problems by adopting a stepwise construction of plans. 
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Appendix A. Proofs of theorems 
A.I. Appendix to Section 4 
First of all we prove two lemmata that originally appeared in [56] without proof. 
The lemmata have already been referenced in Section 2.1. 
Lemma A.1 (Soundness of k3). ff T b” y holds, then T b y holds. 
Proof. Each 3-interpretation of T is also an interpretation of T. Therefore the set of 
interpretations satisfying T is a subset of the set of 3-interpretations satisfying T. The 
same holds for y. Hence if y is true in all the 3-interpretations satisfying T, then it is 
also true in all the interpretations satisfying T. 0 
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Lemma A.2 (Polynomiality of k3>. T b3 y holds iff either a clause subsumed by y 
(i.e. such that all its literals also occur in y) occurs in T or a pair p, up of literals 
occurs in y. Therefore, determining ifT b3 y holds can be checked in O( ITJ . Iyl) time. 
Proof. Let L’ be the alphabet LU{jF I p E L}. Let T’ be the formula obtained from T by 
substituting each occurrence of a negative literal 1p with the corresponding letter F of 
L’. Let y’ be the clause obtained from y in the same way. Let T” be the formula obtained 
by conjoining T’ with all the clauses of the set {(p V j?) I p E L}. Let y” be the clause 
obtained from y’ in the same way. It is easy to notice that there is a l-l correspondence 
between the set of 3-interpretations of T and the set of interpretations of T”: in each 
3-interpretation of T the unique constraint on the truth values of a pair of corresponding 
literals p, lp is that they cannot be both 0; moreover, in each interpretation of T” the 
unique constraint on the truth values of a pair of corresponding literals p,B is that they 
cannot be both 0. The same property holds for the set of 3-interpretations of y and the 
set of interpretations of y”. Therefore T b3 y holds iff T” b y” holds. Since negative 
literals do not occur either in T” or in y”, the last relation holds iff either a clause 
subsumed by y’ (i.e. such that all its literals also occur in y’) occurs in T’ or a pair 
p,p of literals occurs in y’. Therefore T k3 y holds iff either a clause subsumed by y 
occurs in T or a pair p, lp of literals occurs in y. This can be checked in 0( ITI . Iyl) 
time. 0 
Theorem 4.4. For any S and S’ such that S C S’ & L, ifT bi y holds, then T bi, y 
(hence T b y). Moreover if T pf y holds and both a letter 1 of S’ \ S and its negation 
4 do not occur in y, then T &, y holds (hence T p y). 
Proof. As far as b”, is concerned, the proof is the same as that of Lemma A.1. 
As for bi, we prove that T b=f y implies T ki y . Suppose that T +b, y holds and 
that there exists an S-l-interpretation M satisfying T but not satisfying y. We show that 
this leads to a contradiction. 
We build an S’-l-interpretation N of the alphabet L of T in the following way: 
l for each 1 E S, N maps 1 into 1 iff M maps 1 into 1; moreover it maps 11 into the 
opposite value; 
l for each 1 E S’ \ S such that 1 occurs in y, N maps 1 into 0 and 71 into 1; 
l for each 1 E S’ \ S such that 4 occurs in y, N maps 1 into 1 and 4 into 0; 
l for each remaining letter 1, N maps 1 and 71 into 0. 
Notice that N is an S/-l-interpretation of L, since it maps every letter 1 of S’ and its 
negation 4 into opposite values and it maps each remaining literal into 0. Moreover, 
it satisfies T, since M maps at least one literal per clause of T into 1, and the set of 
literals that N maps into 1 is a superset of the set of literals M maps into 1. It is easy to 
notice that N does not satisfy y. but this contradicts the hypothesis that T FL, y holds. 
0 
Theorem 4.6. There exists an algorithm for deciding if T ki y and deciding if T ki y 
which runs in 0( ITI . IyI .21sl) time. 
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Proof. As far as bi is concerned, forthcoming Theorem A.3 states that T ki y can be 
tested by performing 2isl tests of the kind T b3 6, where 6 has size proportional to the 
size of y. Using Lemma A.2, we obtain the desired upper bound for the complexity of 
6. 
As for bi, Theorem 5.3 reduces T +L y to the problem of testing S-1-unsatisfiability 
of TA& where 6 is a CNF formula with size proportional to the size of y. As we already 
showed in Section 5, S-1-satisfiability of a formula r in NNF can be tested in time 
0( Irl .21sl) by: ( I ) substituting each positive or negative literal whose corresponding 
letter occurs in S with the propositional constant false; (2) running any satisfiability 
algorithm on the resulting formula. 0 
Theorem A.3 (From S-3-entailment to 3-entailment). Let S be the set {al,. . . , anI}. 
T ki y iffT k=’ yV [(al A ~1) v . . v (a,, A lam) ] holds, or equivalently T k3 
yv (Cl v... V c,,) holds for any combination {cl,. . . , c,,}, where each Ci (1 6 i 6 m) 
is either ui or Tui. 
Proof. 
(Only if part) Suppose that T bi y holds and a set {cl,. . . , c,} exists where each 
ci ( I < i < m) is either a, or ~a,, such that T I3 cl V . . V c, holds. We show that 
this leads to a contradiction. 
If T F” cl V . . V c,, holds, then a 3-interpretation M satisfying T exists such that T 
does not satisfy cl V V c,,. Notice that M maps each literal ci (1 6 i < m) into 0. 
This implies that it maps each literal 7Ci ( 1 < i 6 m) into 1. Therefore, M is also an 
S-3-interpretation, but this contradicts the hypothesis that T k’, y. 
(If part) Suppose that both T /==’ (al A 7~1) V . V (a,, A -urn) and T ki y. We 
show that this leads to a contradiction. 
If T p:‘, y, then an S-3-interpretation M satisfying T and not satisfying y exists. We 
build a set H of literals in the following way: for each i ( 1 < i 6 m), if M maps ai into 
0, then put ai in H; if M maps YUi into 0, then put TUi in H. Notice that exactly one 
literal in {Ui, YUi} ( 1 < i < m) occurs in H. Let H be {cl,. . . , c,}, where each ci (1 < 
i 6 m) is either ai or TUi. Since M is a 3-interpretation satisfying T, T F3 cl V. . . V c,, 
holds, but this contradicts the hypothesis that T k3 (al A ~a1 ) V. . .V (a,, A xnl) holds. 
0 
A.2. Appendix to Section 5 
Lemma 5.2. Suppose letters(y) g S holds. Let S’ be the set S U letters(y). T bi y 
holds iff T ki, y holds. 
Proof. 
(Only ifpurt) See Theorem 4.4. 
(If part) Suppose both T pi y and T f=i, y. We will show that this leads to a 
contradiction. An S-3-interpretation M exists such that M satisfies T and it does not 
satisfy y. It follows that M maps each literal of y into 0. This implies that M maps 
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each literal of my into 1, therefore M is also an S’-3_interpretation, but this contradicts 
the hypothesis that T bi, y holds. 0. 
Theorem 5.3. L.et y be ys V E, where both letters(ys) C S and letters(E) f~ S = 0 
hold. T bi y holds iff T U (1~s) is not S-1-satisjable. 
PnBof. 
(Only ifpart) Suppose that Tu{-~ys} is S-l-satisfiable; let M be the S-l-interpretation 
satisfying it. M satisfies T, but it does not satisfy ys. Moreover, M does not satisfy rs 
because it maps all its literals into 0. Therefore T kf ys V rs holds. 
(If part) Suppose that T U (7~s) is not S-l-satisfiable and that T pi y holds. We 
show that this leads to a contradiction. An S-l-interpretation M exists such that M 
satisfies T and does not satisfy y. M maps each literal of y into 0. Since no literal of 
ys is in L \ S, M satisfies 1~s. Therefore M satisfies T U { ~ys}, but this contradicts the 
former hypothesis. 0 
Theorem 5.4. Let letters(y) C S hold. T ki y holds i$?T U (7~) is not S-3-satisfiable. 
Proof. Analogous to that of Theorem 5.3 with y = ys. 0 
Theorem 5.5. Let 6 be a set of literals such that letters(S) C S holds and both a letter 
1 and its negation --J do not occur in 6; simplify(T, S) is S-1-satis$able iff T U S is 
S- 1 -satis$able. In addition, simplify( T, S) is S-3-satis$able iff T U 6 is S-3-satisfiable. 
Proof. 
(If part for both properties) Suppose that T U 6 is S-x-satisfiable (X = 1 or 3). Let 
M be an S-x-interpretation satisfying it. M maps each literal of 6 into 1. Since S C S 
holds, M maps the negation of each literal of S into 0. Therefore, given any clause p 
of T in which the negation of a literal of S occurs, M satisfies one of the remaining 
literals of p. Taking into account hat the only clauses of simplify(T, 6) are subclauses 
of those in which the negation of a literal of S occurs, we can easily notice that M 
satisfies implify( T, 8). 
(Only if part for both properties) Suppose that simplifr( T, 8) is S-x-satisfiable. Let 
M be an S-x-interpretation satisfying it. Notice that M satisfies every clause of T in 
which no literal of S occurs. Recall that no literal of S occurs in simplify( T, 6). We build 
an S-x-interpretation N according to the following rule: N maps any literal I of 6 into 
1 and its negation 4 into 0; moreover, N is equivalent to M for any remaining literal. 
M satisfies every clause of T in which no literal of S occurs; therefore N satisfies the 
same clauses. Moreover, N satisfies all the literals in S and every clause of T in which 
at least one literal of S occurs. Therefore N satisfies T U 6. 0 
Theorem 5.6. A formula T is S-3-satisfiable iff Tm is S-3-satisfiable iff 0 #- Tm. A 
formula T is S- 1-satis$able iff Tm is S-l-satisfiable iff T”’ = R 
Proof. We divide the proof into two parts, first of all we prove, at the same time, the 
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two equivalences: T is S-3satisfiable iff T”’ is S-3-satisfiable and T is S-l-satisfiable 
iff T”’ is S-l-satisfiable. In the last part we prove the other two equivalences: Tm is 
S-3-satisfiable iff 0 6 T”’ and T”’ is S-l-satisfiable iff Tm = R. We prove the first part 
by induction on m. The base case is trivial since 7c = T, in the inductive case we have: 
(rfpart for both properties) Suppose that there is an S-x-interpretation I satisfying 
T’ (0 < i < m) then I maps into 1 at least one literal of any clause of T’. Let us 
assume that there is one clause /3 of T’+’ which is not satisfied by I we show that 
this leads to a contradiction. This clause /? cannot belong to T’ because it would be 
satisfied by I, so it must be the resolvent of two clauses pt = {dt, . . . ,dk,ai+l} and 
P2={flt...tfj9 lai+l} of T’ h’ h w ic resolved upon ai+,. Since I satisfies pt and /32 
but not /3 then it must be the case that I maps ai+t and lUi+t into 1, but this contradicts 
the hypothesis that Z is an S-x-interpretation. 
(Only ifpart for both properties) Suppose that there is an S-x-interpretation Z satis- 
fying T’+’ (0 < i < m) then Z maps into 1 at least one literal of any clause of T’+‘. 
Let us assume that there is one clause pi of T’ which is not satisfied by Z we show that 
this leads to a contradiction. This clause pt cannot belong to T’+’ because it would be 
satisfied by I, so in it must occur ui+i and Z maps ai+t into 0, or in it occurs lui+i 
and Z maps lu;+i into 0. In the first case define a new S-x-interpretation I’ which is 
equivalent to Z except that it maps Ui+t into 1, notice that this new interpretation Z’ 
satisfies T’+’ because a;+, does not occur in it. If there is another clause p2 E T’ which 
is not satisfied by I’ then in /?2 must occur TUi+t and now we have that the resolvent of 
/?I and flz belongs to T i+’ but this resolvent is not satisfied by I’ hence contradiction. , 
We now show that T” is S-3-satisfiable iff 0 $ Tm and T” is S-l-satisfiable iff 
T”’ = 0. Notice that T”’ does not contain any of the letters of S, hence T”’ is S-3- 
satisfiable iff it is 3-satisfiable, but any formula not containing 0 is 3-satisfiable because 
the 3-interpretation mapping all the literals into 1 will satisfy it. For the same reason, 
T”’ is S-l-satisfiable iff it is l-satisfiable, but any formula containing at least one clause 
is l-unsatisfiable because the l-interpretation maps all the literals into 0 and, therefore, 
does not satisfy it. 0 
Theorem 5.7. A formula T is S-3-sutisjkble iff there exists a H E a” that is S-3- 
sutisjiuble; H is S-3-sutisykble iff 0 # H. A formula T is S-1-sutisfiuble iff there exists 
an H E CP that is S-1-sutisJuble; H is S-I-sutisjuble ifs H = R 
Proof. We divide the proof into two parts, first of all we prove, at the same time, the 
two equivalences: T is S-3-satisfiable iff there exists a H E @” that is S-3-satisfiable 
and T is S-l-satisfiable iff there exists a H E @“’ that is S-l-satisfiable. In the last part 
we prove that any H E P’ is S-3-satisfiable iff 0 @ H and it is H is S-l-satisfiable iff 
H = R. We prove the first part by induction on m. The base case is trivial since p = T, 
in the inductive case we have: 
(,fpurt for both properties) Suppose that there is an S-x-interpretation Z satisfying 
an H E @’ (0 < i < m) then Z maps into 1 at least one literal of any clause of H. 
There are two formulae HI = simplifl( H, {ui+l}) and Hz = simplify( H, {YZ~+I}) which 
occur in @+I. Since Z is an S-x-interpretation it maps ai+i into 1 and TUi+t into 0 or 
the reverse; we show that in the first case Z satisfies HI, while in the second case Z 
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satisfies Hz. We examine the first case, the other case is similar. We assume that there is 
a clause p in HI which is not satisfied by I and show that this leads to a contradiction. 
It is clear that Z3 does not belong to H, hence /3 has been obtained by pt = PU {lUi+l} 
where pt E H, but now we have that Z does not validate /?I because I maps into 0 all 
literals of p and also maps lai+l into 0, hence we obtain a contradiction. 
(Only ifpart for both properties) Suppose that there is an S-x-interpretation I satis- 
fying an HI E &’ (0 < i < m) then Z maps into 1 at least one literal of any clause of 
HI. Since in HI the literals ai+t and Tai+i do not occur then also the interpretation I’ 
which is equal to I, except hat it maps these two literals into the opposite of the value of 
I, satisfies HI. We know that there exist an H E @ s.t. either H1 = simplify( H, {ai+l}) 
or HI = simplify(H, { lai+l}), we show that in the first case Z satisfies H while in 
the second case I’ satisfies H. We examine the first case, the other case is similar. We 
assume that there is a clause /3 in H which is not satisfied by Z and show that this 
leads to a contradiction. It is clear that /? has been eliminated in the simplifying process, 
because otherwise it would be satisfied by I. But the only reason why it may have 
been eliminated is because in it occurs ai+t and in this case p is satisfied by I, hence 
contradiction. 
The last part is immediately proven noticing that any H E CD”’ will not contain any 
literal of the set S, hence the result trivially follows from the proof of the last part of 
the Theorem 5.6. 0 
Theorem 5.8. Let S be the set {al, . , . , a,,,}. T is S-3-unsatisfiable iff T k3 (al A la1 ) V 
. . . V (a, A w,,,) holds, or equivalently T k3 (cl V . . . V c,) holds for any combination 
{Cl,.. . , c,}, where each ci ( 1 < i < m) is either ai or 1~. 
Proof. See proof of Theorem A.3. 0 
Theorem 5.9. Let S be the set {al, . . . , a,,,}. T is S-l-satisfiable iff there exists a set 
(Y={c,,... , c,}, where each ci ( 1 < i < m) is either ai or yai, such that simplify( T, (u) 
contains no clauses. 
Proof. 
(If part) Suppose that for a set cy = {cl,. . . , c,}, where each ci ( 1 < i < m) is 
either ai or Tai, such that simplify( T, a) does not contain any clause. We define an 
S-l-interpretation M according to the following rule: M maps every letter 1 of L \ S 
and its negation 71 into 0; M maps every letter Ui of L \ S into 1 iff ai occurs in a, 
otherwise it maps ai into 0; M maps lai into the opposite value. Taking into account 
that the process of simplification deletes all the clauses of T which contain a literal 
appearing in CY, we can easily notice that M maps at least one literal per clause of T 
into 1. Therefore M is an S-l-interpretation satisfying T. 
(Only if part) Suppose that T is S-l-satisfiable and let M be an S-l-interpretation 
satisfying it. We define a set of literals a according to the following rule: if M maps 
a letter ai of S into 1 then ai occurs in CY; if M maps a letter ai of S into 0 then Tai 
occurs in CY. Notice that (Y is the set {cl,. . . , c,}, where each ci ( 1 < i 6 m) is either 
ai or lai. Taking into account hat M maps at least one literal per clause of T into 1, 
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we can easily notice that simplifi( T, (Y) does not contain any clause, since the process 
of simplification deletes all the clauses of T which contain a literal occurring in a. 0 
A.3. Appendix to Section 6 
Theorem 6.1. (k 0: a --f q 3,y) iff ( q a A 10: y is unsatisjable) ifs (a /=i y) 
Proof. We prove the theorem by showing the following three properties: 
( 1) (Ci~cz /\ ~0~ y is unsatisfiable) implies ( k I& -+ q iy); 
(2) (+ O&Y -+ q liy) implies (cu bz y); 
(3) ((u /=l y) implies (I& A ~0~ y is unsatisfiable). 
Proof of ( 1). Assume that C&r A 7 0: y is unsatisfiable and k Cl& + q iy holds. 
As a consequence we have: 
( I ) zlM.EIs.M, s F cl+ + q ;y. 
(2) 3M.&.(M,s F 7 0: a) and (M,s p 0;~). 
(3) 3M.3s.~(3t E S-3(Sit) sRt and M,t F a) and -(Vt E S-3(Sit) sRt implies 
M,t t= Y). 
(4) 3M.&.(Vt E S-3(Sit) sRt implies M, t k a) and (3 E S-3(,%) sRt and 
M,t Fyr,. 
(5) 3M.&.M,s + q $ and M, s + 7 0:~. 
(6) 3M.3s.M, s + 0;~ A 10; y. 
(7) IJia A 7 0: y is satisfiable, hence contradiction. 
Proof of (2). Assume that (k 0; LY + 0;~) and (CX pi y). Hence, there exists 
an S-3-interpretation I s.t. I /= Q and I /+ y. Let M = (Sit, R, V) where Sit = {s}, 
R = ((s, s)} and V(s) = I. We have that M, s + a and M,s k y. Since s is the 
only situation in Sit, we also have that M, s b q l$ and M, s /= 7 0: y. Therefore, 
M, s F q l$ + q iy, but this contradicts the assumptions. 
Proof of (3). Assume that LY bi y holds and q l$ A 7 0; y is satisfiable. As a 
consequence we have: 
( 1) i’M.Els.M, s /= O&X A 10; y. 
(2) lMEls.(M,s + q i$) and fM,s + -0:~). 
(3) 3M.!ls.(‘v’t E S-3(Sit) sRf implies M,t /= a) and (3t E S-3(Sit) sRt and 
M,t ky). 
(4) 3M.3s.3t E S-3(Sit) sRt and M, t F y AM, t b a). 
(5) There exists an x s.t. x is an S-3-interpretation and x k (Y and x k y. 
(6) LY pi y, hence contradiction. 0 
Theorem 6.2. ( b O&x + 0:~) ifs ( O&z A 7 0: y is unsatisfiable) ifs (a +i y). 
Proof. Simply replace S-l for S-3 in the previous proof. 0 
Theorem 6.3. Let S C S’ C: L. k O&Y + C]~,LY. 
Proof. Assume that i# q $r + q $LY. As a consequence we have: 
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(1) 3M.3s.M, s F 0;~ + q $a. 
(2) 3M.3s.M, s b q ;a and M, s F q ;,CX 
(3) 3M.%.(Vt E S-3(Sit) sRt implies M, t b a) and (3x E S’-3(Sit) sRx and 
M,x pa). 
(4) Since Y-3 (Sit) 2 S-3 (Sit), we have that 3x E S-3 (Sit) SRX and M, x k a. But 
for such an x we also have that M, x k a, hence contradiction. 0
A.4. Appendix to Section 7 
Some of the proofs given in the following use the standard semantics of concept 
languages based on extension functions. Now we briefly recall this semantics (for more 
details see [ 683 ) . 
An interpretation Z = (A’, . ‘) consists of a set AZ (the domain) and a function -’ 
that maps every concept o a subset of A’ and every role to a subset of AZ x AZ such 
that 
T==A=, I’=@, 
(CrlD)==c’nD=, (-A)’ = A= \ A=, 
(VR.C)= = {a E A= 1 @.(a, b) E ti ---) b E CT}, 
(3R.C)= = {u E A= 1 3b.(a, b) E RZ A b E C”}. 
A concept C is satisfiable if and only if there exists an interpretation Z such that Cz 
is non empty. We say C is subsumed by D (C L D) if for every interpretation Z we 
have Cz G D’. 
In order to prove some of the results of the paper we need the following lemma. 
Let C be an ALC concept and D one of its subconcepts, we denote with C( D/G) the 
concept obtained by replacing every occurrence of D in C with the concept G. 
Lemma A.4 Let C be an ALC concept and D one of its subconcepts which is not in 
the scope of any 1 operators. Let G be another ALC concept. If D 5 G, then C (D/G) 
is satis$able if C is satisfiable. On the other hand, if G 5 D then C is satisfiable if 
C (D/G) is satisjable. 
hf. The proof is done by induction on the structure of C. In the base case we 
have that C = D, thus C(D/G) = G and D 5 G. Then satisfiability of C implies 
satisfiability of C (D/G). In the general case we have to show that all the language 
constructors except negation preserve this property. In particular D C G implies 
C’ n D C C’ n G, C’ U D 5: C’ U G, 
3R.D C 3R.G, VR.D 5 VR.G. 
The proof is straightforward for all cases. A dual argument holds for the case of G C D. 
0 
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Theorem 7.3. For each i (0 < i < n + I ) , if CjT is unsatis$able then C,? is unsatis$able 
for all j > i, hence C is unsatisfiable. 
For each i (0 < i < n + I), if CjL is satisfiable then C,A is satisjable for all j > i, 
hence C is satisfiable. 
Proof. It follows from Lemma A.4. In one case we are replacing subconcepts of C 
with T and it is always the case that a concept is subsumed by T. Furthermore, even 
if dC& allows negation, we never replace subconcepts which are under the scope of -, 
operator so the proof of Lemma A.4 still holds. In the other case, in which we replace 
subconcepts of C with I, the other part of Lemma A.4 is used. 0 
Theorem 7.5. For all i (0 < i < rz + 1 ), C is Si-3-satisfiable iff Ci’ is satisfiable. 
Proof. Dealing with an S-3-interpretation M, when an atom a E Bt, \ S belongs both to 
M+ and to M-, we say that (Y is mapped into contradiction. 
(Only if part) Suppose that CT is satisfiable, i.e. that SNF(T(CT)) is satisfiable. 
Let M = (M+, M-) be an Herbrand model of SNF(r(CiT)). We define an Si-3- 
interpretation N = (N+ , N-) of SNF( r( C) ) according to the following rules: 
l for each atom cr E Si: 
CXEM+=+ClEN+; 
CYEM-==+atN-; 
l for each atom (Y E Bh \ Si: LY E Ni and LY E N- . 
Notice that N is necessarily an Si-3-interpretation of SNF( r( C) ), since the Herbrand 
Base of SNF(T(CiT)) is equal to Si. We now show that N is also an Si-3-model, thus 
proving that C is Si-3-satisfiable. Since SNF( r( C) > is an universally quantified formula, 
it is sufficient to show that N satisfies all its ground instances. We split the proof in two 
subcases: 
(1) All the variables of SNF( T( C)) are bound to terms belonging to Ui. In this 
case for every instance g of SNF( r( C) ) there exists a corresponding instance h 
of SNF( r( CiT> > , where the same variables are bound to the same terms. More 
precisely, all the atoms of h belong to Si, and h is obtained from g by substituting 
some of its subformulae with T. All the atoms occurring in these subformulae 
are instantiated on terms of uk \ c/i, where k > i and uk is a stratum of the 
Herbrand Base of SNF( T( C ) ) . Therefore all these atoms belong to Sk \ Si, hence 
are mapped into contradiction by N. Since M k SNF( r( CiT) ), we know that 
M + h, hence N + h. Since g differs from h in some literals which are anyway 
mapped into contradiction by N, it follows that N + g. 
(2) At least one variable of SNF( T(C)) is bound to a term not belonging to (Ii. 
By definition of N, we know that all the atoms instantiated to those terms are 
mapped by N to contradiction. Since the Herbrand Universe of SNF(r(CiT)) 
is equal to Ui, some instances g of SNF( r( C)) do not have a corresponding 
instance of SNF( r(CiT) ). Let us consider an instance g’ of SNF( r(CiT)) 
obtained from g by binding any variable not bound to terms belonging to Vi to 
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terms of Vi in an arbitrary way. From the previous item we know that N + g’. 
Remember all the atoms instantiated to terms not belonging to Ui are mapped 
into contru&ction by N. Therefore g differs from g’ in some literals which are 
mapped into contradiction by N, hence it follows that N j= g. 
(If part) Suppose that C is Si-3-satisfiable, i.e. that SNF( r( C) ) is Si-3-satisfiable. 
Let N = (N+ , N- ) be an S-3 Herbrand model of SNF( r( C) ) . We define an Herbrand 
interpretation M = (M+, h4-) of SNF(r(CiT)) according to the following rule. For 
each atom (Y E Si: 
Notice that M is necessarily an Herbrand interpretation of SNF( r( CiT) ), since the 
Herbrand Base of SNF(I’(CiT)) is equal to Si. We now show that M is also an Her- 
brand model, thus proving that CiT is satisfiable. Since SNF(r(CT)) is an universally 
quantified formula, it is sufficient o show that M satisfies all its ground instances g. Let 
h be any instance of SNF( r( C) ) which corresponds to g, where the same variables are 
bound to the same terms. Since N k SNF(T(C)), we know that N b h. Moreover h 
is obtained from g by substituting each occurrence of T with a formula. Since T occurs 
always positively in g and is satisfied by M, it follows that M + g. 0 
Theorem 7.6. For all i (0 < i 6 n + 1 ), C is Si-1-satisjable iff Ci’ is satisjiable. 
Proof. Dealing with an S-l-interpretation M, when an atom (Y E Bh \ S belongs neither 
to M+ nor to M-, we say that CY is mapped into undejned. 
(Only if part) Suppose that CF is satisfiable, i.e. that SNF(T(CF)) is satisfiable. 
Let M = (M+,M-) be an Herbrand model of SNF(T(Ck)). We define an Si-l- 
interpretation N = (N+ , N-j of SNF( r( C) ) according to the following rules: 
l for each atom LY E Si: 
l foreachatomaEBh\Si:cr#N’andcu$N-. 
Notice that N is necessarily an Si- l-interpretation of SNF( r( C) ), since the Herbrand 
Base of SNF(T(CF)) is equal to Si. We now show that N is also an Si-l-model, 
thus proving that C is Si-l-satisfiable. Since SNF( r( C)) is an universally quantified 
formula, it is sufficient o show that N satisfies all its ground instances. We recall that, by 
definition of S-1-satisfiability, we have only to consider ground instances of SNF( r( C) ) 
in which variables are substituted by terms of the set Terms( Si), which are the terms 
occurring in the set Si, i.e. are the terms of Vi, Therefore we know that all the variables 
of SNF( r( C) ) are bound to terms belonging to Ui. This implies that for every instance 
g of SNF( T(C)) there exists a corresponding instance h of SNF(r(C,‘)), where the 
same variables are bound to the same terms. More precisely, all the atoms of h belong 
to Si, and h is obtained from g by substituting some of its subformulae with 1. Since 
M b SNF( I’( C,‘)), we know that M b h, hence N b h. Notice that J_ is not satisfied 
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by N, therefore N k g even if the subformulae in which g differs from h are not 
satisfied. Since this is the “worst” case, it follows that N b g. 
(Ifparr) Suppose that C is &-l-satisfiable, i.e. that SNF( T(C)) is $-l-satisfiable. 
Let N = (N+, N-) be an Si-1 Herbrand model of SNF(T(C)). We define an Herbrand 
interpretation M = (M+, M-) of SNF( r(C,‘)) according to the following rule. For 
each atom (Y E Si: 
Notice that M is necessarily an Herbrand interpretation of SNF( r(C,‘-)), since the 
Herbrand Base of SNF( P(C,‘)) is equal to Si. We now show that M is also an Her- 
brand model, thus showing that Ci’- is satisfiable. Since SNF(T(Cj’)) is an universally 
quantified formula, it is sufficient to show that M satisfies all its ground instances g. Let 
h be any instance of SNF( r( C) ) which corresponds to g, where the same variables are 
bound to the same terms. Since N k SNF( r( C)), we know that N k h. Moreover h 
is obtained from g by substituting each occurrence of I with a formula. All the atoms 
occurring in this formula are instantiated on terms of uk \ u;, where k > i and uk is 
a stratum of the Herbrand Base of SNF( r( C)). Therefore all these atoms belong to 
Sk \ S,, hence are mapped into undefined by N. Since M maps _L into 0, it follows that 
Mkg.0 
Theorem 7.7. Let P be a subset of A and i be an index such that 0 < i 6 n + 1. If Cp’i 
is unsatisjiable, then any subconcept D of C such that CA. 3 D is unsatisfiable. If C$. 
is satisfiable, then any subconcept D of C such that C~i 3 D is satisfiable. 
Proof. The same proof of Theorem 7.3 applies also in this case. In fact, we only allow 
negation in front of primitive concepts. Hence, we never replace subconcepts that are in 
the scope of the 7 operator. 0 
Theorem 7.9. For all i (0 < i < n + I) and P c A the concept C is Sei-3-satisfiable 
iff C& is satisfiable. 
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 7.5 with the additional complication 
of replacing some of the primitive concepts and their negation with T. This is however 
already taken into account when we define the Herbrand Base Bh of a simplified concept 
C&. In fact, Bh will only contain atoms of concepts appearing in CA and, even in this 
case, is equal to S,i. Hence, the same proof of Theorem 7.5 applies. 0 
Theorem 7.10. For all i (0 < i < n + 1) and P C A the concept C is Sci-I-satisJi&le 
iff C~i is satisfiable. 
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 7.6 since similar considerations to 
the ones done in the proof of Theorem 7.9 hold. 0 
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A.5. Appendix to Section 8 
Theorem 8.6. For any S and S’ such that S & St C L, if a is S-l-Kripke satisfiable, then 
a is S’-l-Kripke satisfiable (hence 2-Kripke satisfiable). Moreover if a is S-3-Kripke 
unsatisfiable, then a is S’-3-Kripke unsatisfiable (hence 2-Kripke unsatisfiable). 
Proof. Let a be S’-3-Kripke satisfiable and M = (W R, V) one of its S’-3-Kripke 
models. M is also an S-3-Kripke model, since, for each w E W, V(w) is an S-3- 
interpretation. 
Let LY be S-1-Kripke satisfiable and M = (W, R, V) one of its S-1-Kripke models. We 
build an S’-1-Kripke interpretation N = (W, R, V’) in the following way: for each w E W 
l for each 1 E S, V’(w) maps 1 into 1 iff V(w) maps 1 into 1; moreover it maps 4 
into the opposite value; 
l for each 1 E S’ \ S, V’(w) maps 1 into 1 and 11 into 0; 
l for each remaining letter 1, V’(w) maps 1 and 71 into 0. 
Notice that for each w, V’(w) is an S’-l-interpretation of L, since it maps every letter 
1 of S’ and its negation 71 into opposite values and it maps each remaining literal into 
0. Therefore N is an S’-1-Kripke interpretation. 
Theorem 4.4 (applied when y is the empty clause) shows that for any propositional 
formula T and any S, S’ such that S 2 S’, if T is S-l-satisfiable, then T is S’-l-satisfiable. 
Therefore in each w E W the set of propositional formulae satisfied by V’ is a superset 
of the set of propositional formulae satisfied by V, hence N is an S’-l-Kripke model of 
a. 0 
Theorem 8.8. If we restrict our attention to accessibility relations which are reflexive, 
transitive and euclidean, then there exists one algorithm to decide if a is S-l-Kripke 
satisfiable and one to decide if a is S-3-Kripke satisfiable both running in O(m. Ial .21sI> 
time, where m is the number of occurrences of the modal operator in a. 
Proof. The algorithms for checking S-l- and S-3-Kripke satisfiability are based on a 
mapping 7r from any modal formula (Y on the alphabet L into a propositional formula 
~(a) onthealphabetr(L) suchthat\~(L)j=(m+l).ILIandI?r(a)l < (m+l>.laj. 
The alphabet n-(L) is defined as UE!’ UPELpi, that is it contains m + 1 copies of 
each letter of L. If S is a subset of L, then r(S) is defined as UET1 UpESpi. The 
mapping 7r( (u) is defined by the following rewriting rules, where CY, cyt ,cyp are modal 
formulae, and p is in L: 
(al Aa2,i) H (al,i) A (a2,i), 
(w Va2,i) +-+ (w,i) V t&2,9, 
(+a~ Aaz),i) H (-xl,i) V (la2,i), 
(4~ Va2),i) H (-al,9 A C-2,8, 
(Ka,i) I-+ (a, 1) A +..A (a,m + l), 
(+cr,i)++(7~,1)V...V(7~,m+l), 
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(P, i> H P’, 
(lp, i) t-9 lpi. 
It is easy to prove that the 9I-Kripke satisfiability of the modal formula (Y is equivalent 
to the S’-1-satisfiability of the propositional formula 7r( cr), where S’ = r(S). In fact 
the mapping 7~ is based on a generalization of a property of the system S5, stating that 
if /? is a 2-Kripke satisfiable formula with m occurrences of the modal operator, then 
there exists a 2-Kripke interpretation M = (W R, V) and a w E W such that M, w k p 
and where the size of W is less than m + I (see [52, Lemma 6.11). 
The S’-I-satisfiability of T((Y) can be determined in O(m . [al . 21’1) time with the 
algorithms presented in Appendix A.1. Analogous properties hold for the S-3-Kripke 
satisfiability of Q. 0 
Theorem 8.9. If the accessibility relation is unrestricted, then deciding if a is S-I -Kripke 
satisjiable and deciding if cy is S-3-Kripke satisfiable are PSPACE-complete problems 
even if ISI = 1. 
Proof. It is proven in [67] that any formula of the K system can be polynomially 
mapped in a concept of the language d13C such that satisfiability is preserved. It is 
proven in [68] that satisfiability of an ACC concept is a PSPACE-complete problem, 
even if only one primitive concept is used. As a consequence, satisfiability of a formula 
of the K: system in which only one propositional letter occur is PSPACE-complete. 0 
Theorem 8.10. Let (Y be a modal formula and X be a modal system admitting the K 
schema and the rule of necessitation. The formula LY is (S, i)-3-Kripke satisfiable in the 
system X iff &(a) is 2-Kripke satisjable in the system X. 
Proof. (only if part) Assume that LY is (S, i)-3-Kripke satisfiable. Hence, there exists 
a model (over the alphabet L) M = (W R, V) and a world w E W s.t. M, w bi,i 
a. Let Ml = (WI, RI, VI) be a new model (over the alphabet S) where WI = W, 
RI = R, F (x) = V(x) and V, (lx) = V( lx) if x E S. Notice that MI is a 2-Kripke 
interpretation. 
We prove that M 1, w + t,b& (a) by a double induction on i and the size of LY. When 
i is smaller than 0 I&( cu) = t and, therefore, Ml, w k I& (a). If (Y = p or LY = lp it 
is clearly the case that MI, w + +&(cz>. If (Y = cut A (V)a;! then MI, w + @&(a) iff 
MI,W +$i,i(at) and (or) MI,W b=&,,(~2). 
If LY = KP, then it is the case that Vt.wRt implies M, t ki,i_, /?. By the inductive 
hypothesis, M, t ki,j_l /3 implies M 1, t + &, (/?), hence ‘dt.wRt implies M 1, t k 
I+$_, (j3). Therefore, we also have that MI, w k Kt&_, (/I). Since it is easy to show 
that $&(a) = K@j,i_t (P), we also have MI,W + J&((Y). 
A similar proof also applies to cy = 7Kp. 
(If part) Assume that J&((U) is satisfiable. Hence, there exists a model, over the 
alphabet S, MI = (WI, Rl,K) and a world w E W1 s.t. M,w b #&(a). Let M = 
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(W, R, V) be a new model over the alphabet L, where W = WI, R = RI, V(x) = VI(X) 
and V( TX) = L$ (lx) if x E S and V(x) = V( TX) = 1 if x E L \ S. Notice that M is 
an S-3-Kripke interpretation. 
We prove that M, w +i,i a by a double induction on i and the size of (Y. When i is 
smaller than 0, M, w kzi a holds by definition. If cr = p or cy = 1p it is clearly the 
casethatM,w~~,icu.IfCY=al~(V)(Y2thenM,~~~,i*iffM,w~~,i”* and(or) 
M, w +‘s,i (~2. 
If (Y = K/l, then it is the case that Vt.wRt implies Ml, t k S~,i_l (p). By the 
inductive hypothesis, MI, t + ~~,i_1 (p) implies M, t k?&, p, hence Vt.wRt implies 
M, t +&_, p. Therefore, we also have that M, w & Kp which in turn implies 
that M, w +z a. 
A similar proof also applies to CY = -K/l. 0 
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